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THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF AMNESTY IN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 
[S]hall we refuse to the unhappy fugitives from distress that hospitality 
which the savages of the wilderness extended to our fathers arriving in 
this land?  Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on this globe?1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Eduardo Sandoval has lived in the United States without legal 
status for nearly twenty years.2  He now has a wife and three children 
who are all U.S. citizens.3  As the husband of a U.S. citizen, Eduardo 
would otherwise qualify to adjust his status to that of a legal permanent 
resident,4 if not for the fact that he entered without inspection when he 
 1. FRANK G. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES; REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO 1861 97 (1906) (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s message at the 
opening of the Seventh Congress, First Session, in 1801). 
 2. This hypothetical is based on a real case, which I encountered working as a law clerk at an 
immigration firm in Cleveland, Ohio.  The name has been changed to preserve the client’s 
anonymity.  The basic premise is a fairly general archetype that typifies an average undocumented 
immigrant who has resided in the United States for many years. 
 3. Eduardo married a naturally-born U.S. citizen and his children were born in the United 
States.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States . . 
. are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”); see also JEFFREY S. 
PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS, NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS, BACKGROUND BRIEFING 
PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 19 (Pew Hispanic Center 
2005),  http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf (providing data on the number of families that 
this scenario represents: “A significant share of unauthorized families can be characterized as 
‘mixed status’ in which there is one or more unauthorized parent and one or more children who are 
U.S. citizens by birth.”). 
 4. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (West 2006) (hereinafter  INA § 245; 
see Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, It isn’t an Amnesty, but, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGRATION 
BULLETIN 87 (2001) [hereinafter Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty] (explaining “adjustment of 
status” as an alternative to consular processing). 
INA § 245 is the chief vehicle by which persons within the United States adjust their 
status to become legal residents. Until Congress enacted § 245 in 1952, aspiring 
immigrants, even those already in the United States on a temporary visa, had to do 
‘consular processing.’ Under that procedure, still available, the immigrant applies for a 
visa at a U.S. consular office abroad, which is needed to seek admission to the United 
States for permanent residence (the "green card"). 
Id.; see also  IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 636 (Matthew J. Gibney &  Randall Hansen, eds. 2003) 
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first came in to the country in 1988.5  The principal obstacle for Eduardo 
in his quest for legal status is the requirement that he exit the United 
States in order to apply for a visa.6  Once Eduardo leaves the country he 
will trigger an automatic ten-year bar to reentry.7 
Despite the fact that Eduardo has lived and worked in the United 
States longer than he lived in his native country, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”)8 provides no means for him to remain here 
legally.9  Although willing to pay fines and invoke the judicial process, 
(identifying adjustment of status as the most common form of immigration: “Most immigrants are 
in the United States already when their immigration visas become available.  In FY2000, this was 
true for 52 percent of immigrants receiving immigration visas that year.”); NELLY JEFFERYS & 
NANCY RYTINA, U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2005 (2006) available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/USLegalPermEst_5.pdf; and infra note 
229 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4.  A U.S. citizen can petition for an 
alien spouse to become a legal permanent resident by filing form I-130 with the U.S. Citizenship 
and Naturalization Services.  Id. 
Many people who overstayed their visas in the last several years, or who eluded 
inspection and remained, have established strong ties to the United States and are now 
eligible for an immigrant visa. They are or can be the beneficiaries of a family petition 
by a U.S. citizen or lawful resident, or a petition or labor certification by a U.S. 
company. 
Id. 
 6. Because Eduardo entered without inspection he has not officially entered the country 
according to immigration laws. “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an 
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization of an 
immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13) (West 2006).  “[N]o immigrant shall be admitted 
into the United States unless at the time of application for the admission he (1) has a valid unexpired 
immigrant visa or was born subsequent to the issuance of such visa of the accompanying parent.”  
Id. § 1181(a).  The issuance of visas is governed by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1201.  (West 2006). 
 7. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (West 2006) (known commonly as “the bars”).  The three and 
ten-year bars make adjustment of status a legal imperative for undocumented immigrants.  Section 
245 adjustment of status applies to undocumented immigrants under subsection (i).  Id. § 1255(i); 
see Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4. 
 8. All immigration laws are compiled in a uniform set of laws known as the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and incorporated in the United States Code under Title 8. 
 9. The only section of the INA which would have allowed Eduardo to adjust status was 
Section 245(i), which expired April 30, 2001.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i) (West 2006); see also Michael 
D. Cronin, Adjustment of Status under LIFE, INS Memoranda, 6 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION 
BULLETIN 143 (2001) (“Section 245(i) of the Act allows an alien to apply to adjust status under 
section 245 notwithstanding the fact that he or she entered without inspection, overstayed, or 
worked without authorization.”).  Any immigrant who submitted a valid petition for adjustment of 
status before April 30, 2001 is still eligible to rely on the provision.  Id. (“Applications and petitions 
submitted under section 245(i) of the Act may not be rejected prior to May 1, 2001, as long as they 
bear the required fee and the applicant's signature.”). 
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the only option for Eduardo to remain in the United States is to maintain 
his illegal status on the fringes of society.10 
Somewhere between eight million and twelve million 
undocumented immigrants currently live and work in the United States 
under circumstances similar to those of Eduardo Sandoval.11  Many of 
them have established roots here that include U.S. citizens as close 
family members.12  The continually growing population of 
 10. See Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4 (describing adjustment of status as the 
“only hope” for undocumented immigrants to legalize their status given the three and ten-year bars). 
 11. The number used for exactly how many undocumented immigrants currently live and 
work in the United States is subject to interpretation.  The very nature of this class’s subverted 
existence makes calculating an actual number virtually impossible.  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, STATISTICS-ILLEGAL ALIEN RESIDENT POPULATION,  
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (“Estimating the 
size of a hidden population is inherently difficult.”); Critics of immigrants tend to inflate the 
numbers, while advocates are more likely to use lower numbers.  DAVID M. REIMERS, 
UNWELCOMED STRANGERS 28 (Columbia University Press 1998).  “Estimating the number of 
undocumented immigrants has proved to be controversial, with those wanting to halt the illegal flow 
usually employing high figures to dramatize the numbers.”  Id.  In his staunchly anti-immigrant 
book, State of Emergency, Pat Buchanan estimated the number of so-called “invaders” to be 12 
million in 2006.  PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY; THE THIRD WORLD INVASION 
AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA 252 (Thomas Dunne Books 2006).  An often-quoted source for a 
generally unbiased number is the Pew Hispanic Center, which estimated the number at 11 million as 
of March 2005.  JEFFREY S. PASSEL, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED 
MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006),  
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61.  Numbers were calculated based on a 
March, 2004 Population Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of 
Labor.  Id.  At the current rate of growth of half million person a year the Pew Hispanic number 
would be twelve million by March 2007.  Is the Reid-Kennedy Bill a Repeat of the Failed Amnesty 
of 1986?:  Hearing on Senate-passed Reid-Kennedy Bill Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 7, 69 (2006), [hereinafter Reid-Kennedy Hearing] (noting Chairman Sensenbrenner’s 
statement “[o]ur Nation’s broken immigration system has allowed the illegal immigrant population 
to grow at an unprecedented half million persons a year” and Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley’s 
asserted one of the highest estimates conceivable: “based on what resulted from 1986 when there 
were roughly a million people here illegally and with all the legalization and family reunification, it 
came out three or four times what we had.  If you consider the same ratio, then you get into numbers 
that are very big and more accurately maybe 35 to 45 million.”). 
 12. Emma O. Guzman, Comment, The Dynamics of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: The Splitting Up of American Families, 2 SCHOLAR 95, 95-
100 (2000) (discussing the broad impact of 1996 immigration reform legislation as it would affect 
families composed of undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens).  Family unification is one of the 
central arguments used in arguing to reenact Section 245(i).  Maria J. Demeo, Executive Summary 
of the Policy Recommendations to the Bush-Cheney Administration on Education, Political Access, 
Employment, Immigrants’ Rights, Public Resource Equity, and Access to Justice by the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 3, 8 (2001), available at www.maldef.org 
(advocating “to protect and promote the rights of the entire Latino community in the United States” 
by recommending a reenactment of Section 245(i): “[e]xtension of 245(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) will certainly be one of the key legislative items first facing the Bush-Cheney 
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undocumented immigrants13 provokes controversy in various aspects of 
public policy.14  Within the debate over immigration reform lies the 
underlying question of what constitutes amnesty, and whether the term 
itself has prevented meaningful reform measures from taking effect. 
The post-September 11th security concerns that have driven U.S. 
politics in recent years have heavily impacted the amnesty debate.15  
Now more than ever, voters and lawmakers alike are concerned about 
the risk of maintaining the status quo with respect to an unaccounted for 
“shadow population.”16  While some politicians propose legalization as 
a means of documenting these individuals,17 others contend that 
militarizing the border and toughening enforcement of immigration laws 
will better address the issue.18  In between these two extremes are those 
who advocate for broad policy reforms through a comprehensive 
approach.19 
This Article attempts to inform the reader on how politics 
surrounding the term itself has distracted lawmakers, and caused an 
ineffective backlash against all legalization measures.20  The deadlock 
which has prevented George W. Bush’s administration from making any 
significant changes to the INA can be largely attributed to this 
fundamental concern over amnesty.21 
Comprehensive immigration reform has been a key talking point 
for President Bush, as well as Congress, throughout his term.22  The 
issue has inspired repeated attempts to craft a reform measure, and 
Administration.  The Administration should support and promote legislation that provides for full 
and permanent extension of the section 245(i)”). 
 13. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 14. See e.g. infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 200-206 and accompanying text (discussing Senate Bill 2611).  See 
generally BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS; VALUES, MORALITY AND IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 50 (Cambridge 2006) (including security as one reason to enact a legalization provision: 
“legalizing undocumented workers coupled with a large worker program is in the interest of our 
national security and constitutes a step that would aid our country in its efforts to combat 
terrorism”). 
 18. For a discussion on mass deportation proposals see infra notes 128-132 and 
accompanying text.  For a discussion on the most recent attempt to alleviate this tension through 
increased border security see infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 37-79 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 159-211 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra note 116 and accompanying text (criticizing both President Bush and members 
of Congress for clamoring for change, but then stalling from putting such changes into effect). 
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endless amounts of press coverage.23  Politicians throughout this time 
have campaigned by taking a stance on the issue, and voters have 
reacted accordingly.24  Despite avid attempts by Congress and voters’ 
enthusiastic endorsements for reform, very little progress has been made 
under the Bush administration’s term.25 
In an effort to resolve the dilemma of how to address the 
undocumented immigrant problem, this Article proposes two changes to 
the INA.  First, Congress should reenact Section 245(i).26  This code 
section provides an opportunity for undocumented immigrants to 
legalize their status.27  Section 245(i) applies only to a narrow class of 
immigrants who meet the specifications prescribed by the code, and it 
requires applicants to pay a substantial fee.28  Second, the Article 
suggests reexamining the three and ten-year bars, which were put into 
place to deter illegal entry, but in effect have exacerbated the problem by 
 23. See infra notes 80-158 and accompanying text. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See infra notes 212-235 and accompanying text. 
 27. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i) (West 2006).  The original text of the 1994 provision reads: 
(i)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section, an alien 
physically present in the United States who--(A) entered the United States without 
inspection; or (B) is within one of the classes enumerated in subsection (c) of this 
section, may apply to the Attorney General for the adjustment of his or her status to that 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Attorney General may accept 
such application only if the alien remits with such application a sum equalling five times 
the fee required for the processing of applications under this section as of the date of 
receipt of the application, but such sum shall not be required from a child under the age 
of seventeen, or an alien who is the spouse or unmarried child of an individual who 
obtained temporary or permanent resident status under section 210 or 245A of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act or section 202 of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 at any date, who--(i) as of May 5, 1988, was the unmarried child or spouse 
of the individual who obtained temporary or permanent resident status under section 210 
or 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act or section 202 of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986; (ii) entered the United States before May 5, 1988, 
resided in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is not a lawful permanent resident; and 
(iii) applied for benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990. The sum 
specified herein shall be in addition to the fee normally required for the processing of an 
application under this section. (2) Upon receipt of such an application and the sum 
hereby required, the Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien to that of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if--(A) the alien is eligible to receive an 
immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and (B) 
an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is 
filed. (3) Sums remitted to the Attorney General pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
this subsection shall be disposed of by the Attorney General as provided in sections 
286(m), (n), and (o) of this title. 
Id. 
 28. Id. 
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creating a serious disincentive for undocumented immigrants to exit the 
country.29 
This Article reflects on the current state of immigration reform, and 
specifically dissects the role that amnesty has played in preventing 
lawmakers from enacting meaningful changes to the INA.  Section I 
provides an overview of the laws at stake in this Article.30  The Article 
provides a brief introduction to “the first amnesty” and a detailed 
chronology of two measures which should be the subject of debate in 
any immigration reform initiative.31  Section I concludes with a 
discussion about how amnesty factors into the current proposals for 
comprehensive immigration reform.32  Section II discusses the term 
amnesty and how it has been used within the context of immigration 
debates.33  The Article then applies this knowledge to the proposal for 
reenacting Section 245(i).34  Section III specifically addresses the 
Article’s proposals for reform; reenacting Section 245(i) permanently, 
and eliminating the bars to reentry.35  In conclusion, the Article provides 
an overview of the current debate, and responds to arguments in 
opposition to the two main proposals set forth in this Article.36 
II. AMNESTY-RELATED LEGISLATION 
A. Immigration Reform and Control Act 
The first attempt to legalize undocumented immigrants en masse 
was the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) of 1986.37  The 
Act permitted undocumented immigrants to become legal permanent 
 29. Gabriela A. Gallegos, Comment, Border Matters: Redefining the National Interest in 
U.S.-Mexico Immigration and Trade Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1749 (2004) (citing Edward 
Hegstrom, A Risky Border Business, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 19, 2002, at A1) (“Bars to reentry have 
encouraged migrant workers and border residents who work in the United States and live in Mexico 
to stay for longer periods and to send for their family rather than return to their home country.”). 
 30. See infra notes 37-79 and accompanying text. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra notes 80-158 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 159-211 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 212-238 and accompanying text. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See infra notes 239-257 and accompanying text 
 37. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); 
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Lindsay Schoonmaker, Basic Immigration Law 2006:  Overview of U.S. 
Immigration Law, 158 PLI/NY 49, 56 (2006).  For a detailed analysis of IRCA with respect to the 
current immigration debates see Richard A. Johnson, Note, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent 
Need for an Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the 
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 267-75 (2007). 
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residents without leaving the country for the first time since the INA 
began regulating immigration in 1952.38  In addition to a legalization 
program, the law attempted to regulate illegal immigration in various 
other ways.39  The law enhanced border security measures, established 
an employment verification system for employers, and imposed 
sanctions on employers who hire undocumented immigrants.40  IRCA is 
widely recognized as a failed attempt to regulate undocumented 
immigration.41 
The failure of IRCA to control illegal immigration now stands as 
the central hurdle in any campaign for a legalization statute.42  Known 
commonly as the “first amnesty,”43 IRCA has a pervasive legacy.44  
 38. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); 
see U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions: An Historic Opportunity:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 98-99 (2001) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Senator) [hereinafter 
U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions], available at  2001 WL 1021792  (describing the impetus for 
change to the INA that culminated when Congress passed IRCA many years later: “The current 
Immigration and Nationality Act is a generation out of date.  It is out of touch with the times, and 
inadequate to meet modern needs.”). 
 39. President Ronald Reagan, Statement upon Signing S. 1200, Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (Nov. 6, 1986), at 2 [hereinafter IRCA Signing Statement] (President Reagan 
introduced the legislation by describing its three basic components: “[i]n 1981 this administration 
asked the Congress to pass a comprehensive legislative package, including employer sanctions, 
other measures to increase enforcement of the immigration laws, and legalization.  The act provides 
these three essential components.”); see also Shannon Leigh Vivian, Note, Be Our Guest: A Review 
of the Legal and Regulatory History of U.S. Immigration Policy Toward Mexico and 
Recommendations for Combating Employer Exploitation of Nonimmigrant and Undocumented 
Worker, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 189, 206-08 (explaining the employer sanctions implemented by 
IRCA and why they failed to deter illegal immigration). 
 40. See Paul L. Frantz, Undocumented Workers: State Issuance of Driver’s Licenses Would 
Create a  Constitutional Conundrum, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 519-526 (providing an overview of 
the various aspects of IRCA). 
 41. See e.g. Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of Latin 
American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accompanying the Inevitable, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1355, 1373 (2005) (“Despite the ‘sweeping changes’ it introduced to immigration law, IRCA had a 
relatively minor impact that did little to ameliorate the growing problem of illegal immigration.”). 
 42. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 2.  The fifth and final hearing on illegal 
immigration specifically addressed whether adopting an amnesty provision would cause the same 
problems that the 1986 legislation provoked.  Id.  The Chairman of the Committee, F. James 
Sensenbrenner, cast a particularly unfavorable light on the effects of IRCA; “Much of the current 
immigration chaos is a direct result of the disastrous step Congress took two decades ago in passing 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986—without my vote, I might add.”  Id.  Rachel L. 
Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current Immigration Bills in Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES,  May 23, 2006, at A20 (explaining how IRCA’s amnesty failure has created skepticism 
about any future amnesty provisions). 
 43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the term “amnesty” using IRCA 
as the quintessential example).  See also Border Security and Immigration Issues, Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of James R. Edwards, Jr., Hudson Institute) [hereinafter Border Security 
7
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Following IRCA, illegal immigration continued to rise, and many 
undocumented immigrants in the United States remained without legal 
status when the opportunity to apply expired.45  The critical failure of 
IRCA in terms of inspiring sympathetic supporters was the relative ease 
of the legalization process.46 
B. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”) of 1996 made a bold attempt to reduce the growing number 
of undocumented immigrants.47  A new code section barring 
undocumented immigrants from reentry was incorporated as part of this 
expansive body of law.48  The bars were draconian measures intended to 
and Immigration Issues Hearing] (citing the Black’s definition of amnesty and noting that IRCA is 
used as an example in the definition as part of his testimony to Congress regarding S. 2611).   
Contra SUSAN GONZALEZ BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME: THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS OF 
THE IMMIGRATION AND CONTROL ACT 26 (The RAND Corporation & The Urban Institute 1990) 
(refuting IRCA’s label of amnesty and deeming it a "targeted program that balanced the offer of 
legalization with stringent requirements"). 
 44. See This Month in Immigration History: May 1987, 
http://149.101.23.2/graphics/aboutus/history/may1987.html (relating the connection between IRCA 
and the current debate: “In the wake of several ongoing programs to adjust the immigration status of 
other previously illegal migrants, and in light of continuing shortages of labor in many sectors of the 
U.S. economy, including its technology and service sectors, some, like the AFL-CIO, have called 
for another general amnesty for some or all of those currently in the United States illegally.”). 
 45. Kierra LoBreglio, Note, The Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act: A 
Modern Solution to a Historic Problem?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 933, 949-50 (2004) (comparing 
IRCA to the Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act and noting the failure of IRCA); 
Michael J. Mayerle, Comment, Proposed Guest Worker Statutes: An Unsatisfactory Answer to a 
Difficult, if not Impossible, Question, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 559, 571 (2002) (noting 
statistical data on the ineffectiveness of IRCA: “the percentage of farm workers in the United States 
who are undocumented increased from seven percent just after the 1986 immigration amnesty law 
to thirty-seven percent during 1994-95”). 
 46. See JASON JUFFRAS, IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT ON THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE  60 (The RAND Corporation & The Urban Institute 
1991) (providing results of a 2-year study on the implementation of IRCA, which revealed that the 
criteria for legalization were generally not enforced: “The INS exempted many immigrants from the 
English and civics requirement and devised several ways for applicants to demonstrate the minimal 
competence in English and civics needed for permanent residency.  As of January 1990, the Phase 2 
denial rate for the general legalization program was approximately 1 in 10,000.”). 
 47. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009 (1996).  See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President on 
Signing Budget and Immigration Bill (Oct. 1, 1996) (referencing President Clinton’s ideals upon 
signing the law: “[t]his bill also includes landmark immigration reform legislation that reinforces 
the efforts we have made over the last three years to combat illegal immigration.  It strengthens the 
rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the 
criminal justice system”). 
 48. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9) (West 2006) (I.N.A. § 212) (describing the three and ten-year 
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sanction illegal entry.49  They did so by imposing a three or ten-year bar 
to admission or reentry upon any undocumented immigrant who had 
maintained an unlawful presence within the United States.50  Much like 
current proposals to reform immigration, which suggest penalty taxes 
and criminal convictions to punish the act of illegal entry and stay, the 
bars were introduced as a means to deter defiance of immigration laws.51 
The practical effect of the bars has not been deterrence of illegal 
entry or stay, but rather a disincentive for undocumented immigrants to 
leave once they have entered without inspection.52  Because any attempt 
to exit the country or apply for status might trigger the bars, an 
undocumented immigrant successfully avoids the bars by remaining in 
the United States and not applying for any immigration benefit.53  Given 
the serious penalties for making their presence known, undocumented 
immigrants are now more likely than ever to remain undetected.54  
bars for lawful immigration once an undocumented immigrant is found to have been present 
illegally). 
 49. Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 355 (2005).  While the bars were intended to punish immigrants who 
had evaded the law through entry or extended stays, imposing the provision on families who had 
legitimate means to legalize status would punish too harshly.  Barbara Hines, So Near Yet So Far 
Away: The Effect of September 11th on Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 8 TEX. HISP. J.L. 
& POL’Y 37, 39 (2002) (describing the 1996 immigration laws as draconian). 
 50. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (West 2006) (I.N.A. §212); Stephen Yale-Loehr & Brian 
Palmer, Unlawful Presence Update, 6 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 507, at 1 
(2001) (explaining the function of the three-year bar).  While there are stiffer penalties for forced 
removal, these penalties apply to immigrants who leave voluntarily before proceedings begin.  Id.  
Unlawful presence of 180 days to one year subjects the immigrant to the three-year bar.  Id. A stiff 
penalty of ten years applies to unlawful presence that exceeds one year.  Id. 
 51. See Stephen W Yale-Loehr & Miller Mayer, Basic Immigration Law 2006:  Overview of 
U.S. Immigration Law, 158 PLI/NY 49, 57 (2006) (explaining the objective of IIRIRA: “In 1996 
Congress adopted a get-tough attitude toward out-of-status foreign nationals. . . .  The 1996 law 
increased penalties for many immigration violations.”). 
 52. See PASSEL, supra note 3, at 3 (providing speculative data on how the undocumented 
immigrant population has grown since Congress passed IRRIRA: “the unauthorized population has 
been steadily increasing in size (and possibly by large increments since the last half of the 1990s)”). 
 53. See INS Advises Field Offices on Sunset of INA § 245(i), 2 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION 
BULLETIN 847 (1997) (explaining to INS field officers how Section 245(i)’s expiration will affect 
the bars: “Other persons besides immediate relatives (spouses, parents and children of U.S. citizens) 
of U.S. citizens who are eligible to immigrate based on an available visa number, but who arrived 
without inspection or who violated their status can apply for adjustment of status under section 
245(i) by paying a penalty.  If 245(i) sunsets, they will be required to apply for their immigrant visa 
abroad, at which time they will be found inadmissible, if they have been unlawfully present in the 
U.S. for more than 180 days before leaving the U.S.”). 
 54. See Tamar Jacoby, The United States Should Legalize Illegal Immigration, in 
IMMIGRATION 108 (Louise I. Gerdes, ed., 2005) (explaining how current immigration policy 
contravenes the rule of law: “Undocumented workers fear police and other authorities, thereby 
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Essentially, the bars are counter-effective, in that they augment the vast 
population of undocumented immigrants who have every incentive to 
avoid alerting authorities of their presence.55 
C. Section 245(i) 
While the bars ran afoul of immigration goals and exacerbated the 
existing problems, Section 245(i) provided the necessary balance to 
legitimize immigration policy.56 
Congress enacted Section 245(i) for the first time in 1994.57  
Originally the provision was implemented to aid applicants who already 
qualified to adjust status via consular processing.58  For those applicants 
who were eligible for adjustment of status at a consulate abroad, Section 
245(i) granted domestic INS offices the authority to adjudicate those 
undermining law enforcement in their communities.  They come to believe the U.S. laws, like the 
immigration code, are meant to be winked at.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Hearing on H.R. 3362 Before the H. Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, 
and Refugees of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 5 (1994) (statement of Katherine L. 
Vaughns, submitted prior to hearing).  In this testimony given when Congress was considering 
Section 245(i) for the first time, Professor of Law Katherine L. Vaughns articulated the immigration 
goal served by Section 245(i): 
[S]ection 302 of Title III prohibits the privilege of adjusting one’s status here in the 
United States to those beneficiaries of immediate relative visa approvals heretofore 
eligible to receive such benefit.  This is a congressional prerogative.  However, in light 
of recent congressional action allowing otherwise ineligible applicants the adjustment of 
status privilege, perhaps section 302 may prove to be counter-productive.  Given the 
apparent legislative desire to provide an incentive for aliens to adjust their status in the 
United States instead of going abroad for immigrant visa processing overseas, such a 
measure would thwart this objective. 
Id.; see also PASSEL, supra note 3, at 16 (identifying Section 245(i)’s disappearance as a possible 
explanation for the increased undocumented immigrant population: “There is some suspicion that 
the more-or-less orderly transition process . . . may have been short-circuited by the legislative 
changes of the late 1990s, especially affecting 245(i).  If true, this change should partially explain 
the buildup in the unauthorized Mexican population.”); but see Steven A. Camarota & Jessica 
Vaughan, Op.-Ed., A Loophole in Immigration Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/sac_jfv10-21-97.html (arguing against Section 245(i) in order to 
give effect to the bars: “The sunset of 245(i) is necessary in order to activate a powerful 
enforcement tool passed last year. . . . If 245(i) ends as scheduled, any illegal alien who aspires to 
[sic] a green card will have to return home within six months or be subject to the new bar.”). 
 57. Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), 108 Stat 1724 (1994); Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-
Loehr, INA 245: How it Works, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 2001, 3, col. 1, [hereinafter Mailman & Yale-
Loehr, INA]; Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Steven C. Bell, & Thomas E. Moseley, IMMIGRATION 
LEGISLATION. HANDBOOK § 9:22 (Thomson/West 2006). 
 58. NICOLE W. GREEN, IMMIGRATION; CQ’S VITAL ISSUES SERIES 64 (Ann Chih Lin ed., CQ 
Press 2002) (“The provision represented a rare opportunity for illegal immigrants to gain legal 
status, since ordinarily they would have to return to their home countries to apply for a visa and 
most would not risk leaving the United States with no sure prospect of legal reentry.”). 
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petitions.59  Section 245(i) was initially adopted as an efficiency 
measure that would not have a broad impact on immigration controls, 
and it was enacted on a provisional basis, set to expire three years after 
its inception. 60
Although not intended as an amnesty provision,61 Section 245(i) 
had the effect of allowing immigrants who entered without inspection 
(“illegally”) to legalize status without leaving the country.62  In 1997 
when Congress extended Section 245(i)’s sunset date to January 14, 
1998, it did so with full knowledge of the far-reaching application that 
the provision had enjoyed over the first three-year period of 
enforcement. 63 
The 1997 reenactment demonstrated that when a provision designed 
to aid undocumented immigrants is considered without political 
underpinnings, which attach to any amnesty debate, it garners bipartisan 
support.64  While some may characterize the 1997 reenactment as an 
oversight on the part of the legislature, the legislative history indicates 
that Congress intended the reenactment as both welcomed and 
necessary. 65 
 59. Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, § 1(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West 2006); 
Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4. 
 60. Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4 (providing background information on 
Section 245(i): “Its rationale, when initially passed, was to ease the burden on applicants who would 
eventually get their green card anyway via consular processing. And the State Department approved 
the provision on grounds of efficiency: it saw little sense in taxing the workload of its consulates 
overseas with applications that could be done by INS offices at home.”). 
 61. Lofgren, supra note 49 at 363 (providing an inside perspective on Congress’ immigration 
reform in 1996; “During the mark-up of IIRIRA, I can recall no discussion of Section 245(i).”). 
 62. GREEN, supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 63. Lofgren, supra note 49 (“Congress voted several times to extend section 245(i), to 
temporarily avert the problem of 3/10-year bar.”). 
 64. Similarly, when IRCA passed the term “amnesty” had not yet developed the negative 
political connotations that it invokes today.  While there was debate over whether to adopt such a 
measure, and some legislators strongly disagreed, those who supported legalization did so without 
defending the rhetoric used.  See 132 CONG. REC. S26,879-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement 
of Sen. Moynihan) (strongly endorsing amnesty: “[f]ortunately, this bill does provide amnesty, for 
those illegal aliens who entered this country prior to January 1, 1982”); see also Amnesty for Illegal 
Immigrants:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Borders, and Claims of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Rep. King) [hereinafter Hearing on Amnesty 
for Illegal Immigrants] (referencing the lack of debate over use of the word amnesty in the IRCA 
legislative history: “we passed amnesty in 1986 and no one argued whether there was amnesty or 
not in 1986 because President Reagan declared it to be amnesty . . . . ”); IRCA Signing Statement, 
supra note 39 (describing the legalization plan signed in to law without any hedging on the benefit 
to undocumented immigrants, but not specifically mentioning the term “amnesty”: “[w]e have 
consistently supported a legalization program which is both generous to the alien and fair to the 
countless thousands of people throughout the world who seek legally to come to America”). 
 65. Joint Memorandum Concerning the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000 and 
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Legislators embraced Section 245(i) as a necessary compliment to 
the bars.  For the majority of undocumented immigrants Section 245(i) 
was the only section of the INA that allowed adjustment of status 
without triggering one of the bars.66  Because Section 245(i) created a 
means to process adjustment of status applications domestically, it 
eliminated the threat of the bars for certain undocumented immigrants.67 
The last extension of Section 245(i) came as part of the Legal 
Immigration Family Equality (“LIFE”) Act, enacted on December 10, 
2000.68  Arguably, this was the first time that Section 245(i) 
The Life Act Amendments of 2000, Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Cong., 146 CONG. REC. 
S11,850-02, S11,851 (2000) (explaining the legislative intent of the amendments, which included an 
extension of Section 245(i): “Because both the original LIFE ACT and this legislation were 
developed outside the ordinary Committee process, they were not accompanied by the usual reports 
elaborating on the background and purpose of their provisions. This memorandum is accordingly 
submitted on behalf of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Immigration of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to provide such elaboration in somewhat abbreviated 
form.”).   The memorandum encourages a liberal application of the extension: “to ensure that all 
potentially eligible persons have an opportunity to qualify for 245(i), if necessary the INS should 
accept petitions and applications before the April 30, 2001 sunset date that do not contain all 
necessary supporting documents, and allow additional documents to be filed after the deadline.”  Id. 
 66. Senator Kennedy described the function of Section 245(i) when he endorsed a bill, the 
Uniting Families Act of 2002, which would have reenacted the provision: 
This legislation extends section 245(i), a vital provision of U.S. immigration law which 
allows individuals who already legally qualify for permanent residency to process their 
applications in the United States, without returning to their home countries.  Without 
245(i), immigrants are forced to leave their families here in the U.S. and risk separation 
from them for up to 10 years. 
Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 148 CONG. REC. S4,147-01, S4,155 (2002) 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).  Uniting Families Act of 2002: 
SEC. 2. LIMITED EXTENSION OF SECTION 245(i) PROGRAM. (a) EXTENSION 
OF FILING DEADLINE.-Section 245(i)(1)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(i)(1)(B)(i)) is amended by striking "on or before April 30, 2001" and 
inserting "on or before April 30, 2003." (b) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN 
INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS.-The amendment made by subsection 
(a) shall not apply to any alien who is-(1) inadmissible under section 212(a)(3), or 
deportable under section 237(a)(4), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to 
security and related grounds); or (2) deportable under section 237(a)(1)(G) of such Act 
(relating to marriage fraud). (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by 
subsection (a) shall apply to applicants for adjustment of status who are beneficiaries of 
petitions for classification or applications for labor certifications filed before, on, or after 
the date of enactment of this Act. 
Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, § 1(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255.  President William J. 
Clinton, Statement upon Signing H.R. 4577 (Dec. 21, 2000), at 2, available at 2000 WL 1871653.  
This final reenactment differed sharply from the previous versions which had passed without 
political controversy.  The President’s signing statement acknowledged that the legislation was not 
easily agreed upon: “While I am disappointed that the legislation fails to eliminate the disparate 
treatment under our immigration laws sought for Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, Haitians, 
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was smeared with the label of amnesty.69  The news release for the 
Act specifically denied the label, and from that moment it  
became clear that continued reenactments would no longer pass through 
Congress without controversy.70  Although the provision had received  
enthusiastic support from both President Clinton71 and President  
Bush,72 Section 245(i) expired on April 30, 2001.73 
and Liberians and does not provide any relief for deserving individuals affected by changes in the 
1996 immigration law, it is the best compromise that could be reached after several rounds of 
intense negotiations.”  Id.  President William J. Clinton, Message to Congress, Message on 
Unfinished Work of Building One America (Jan. 15, 2001), at 18.  The President asserted that the 
four-month extension of Section 245(i) was inadequate.  He pressed Congress to adopt the provision 
permanently.  Id.  Courts have interpreted the intent of the statute: “the LIFE Act was written to 
provide an exception to the general rule that aliens who entered the country without inspection are 
ineligible to seek adjustment to lawful permanent status.”  Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 
1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 69. See News Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Washington, D.C. 20536, INS Implements § 245(i) Provision of the LIFE Act (Mar. 23, 2001), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/Section245iLIFEAct_032301.pdf (having to 
defend the law from attracting this label: “it is not amnesty for all persons unlawfully in the United 
States”). 
 70. Id.; Espinal v. Pere, 144 F. Supp. 2d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (interpreting the “not amnesty 
for all persons” language of the News Release to mean that it does not apply to all persons 
unlawfully in the United States, but finding the code section to be an amnesty nonetheless). 
 71. Fact Sheet on the Passing of a Fiscally Responsible Budget, The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, President Clinton Calls on Congress to Act on America’s Education Priorities 
(Oct. 19, 2000), at 4 (President Clinton ‘s forceful approach gave Congress a clear directive to save 
Section 245(i) before the impending expiration: “People who have been living in the United States 
for many years and have developed strong ties to their communities deserve the opportunity to 
normalize their immigration status, and families should be allowed to stay together while an 
adjustment of status application is pending.  Congress should address these injustices in the 
immigration system by . . . reinstating Sec. 245(i).  The President will insist that Congress enact 
these commonsense measures, supported by both business and fundamental fairness, this year.”).  
See also Fact Sheet on Progress on America’s Priorities, President Clinton and Vice President Gore: 
Progress on America’s Priorities (Dec. 15, 2000) (touting the reinstatement of Section 245(i) as one 
of the administration’s most noteworthy achievements).  The release acknowledged the drastic 
effects of IRRIRA and urged the next Congress to do more to soften the impact.  Id. 
 72. Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker and Democratic leader of the House of 
Representatives and the Majority and Democratic leaders of the Senate, The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary (May 1, 2001), [hereinafter President Bush’s Letter to Congress].  President 
Bush’s address demonstrated a solid understanding of the three and ten year bars, and 
acknowledged Section 245(i) as a necessary cushion to those harsh sanctions.  Id.  His approach 
with Congress focused on an appeal to strengthen families.  Id.  President Bush’s speech to the 
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC, Office of the Press Secretary (March 6, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020306-4.html. 
I’ve told the Congress that I want to make sure that the Mexican citizen here is well 
respected, and we will.  We’ll respect people in our country.  And one way to do that is 
to pass 245(i), which will allow for families to be reunited.  If you believe in family 
values, if you understand the worth of family and the importance of family, let’s get 
245(i) out of the United States Congress and give me a chance to sign it. 
Id. 
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In May of 2001, President Bush urged Congress to extend the filing 
deadline for Section 245(i) beneficiaries.74  He acknowledged that the 
April deadline would be hard-felt by the multitude of undocumented 
immigrants who had been eligible to apply for adjustment prior to the 
deadline, but had not acted soon enough.75 
Once the deadline passed in 2001 the true effect of the bars was felt 
for the first time.76  Without Section 245(i) as part of the INA, the 
possibility of adjusting status domestically disappeared completely for 
any undocumented immigrant who had failed to submit a visa 
application before the deadline.77  In a sense, these individuals were 
trapped by the system, unable to apply domestically, nor able to leave 
and return.78  Suddenly any attempt to legalize status became a catch-22, 
whereby undocumented immigrants could not submit a visa application 
without leaving the country and thereby triggering a bar to reentry.79 
III. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 
Combining a legalization program as one element of a broader 
reform effort is the basic concept behind “comprehensive immigration 
reform.”80  Comprehensive reform has become a catch-phrase which 
 73. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i)(1)(B) (West 2005) (requiring that a “petition for classification under 
section 1154” be filed “on or before April 30, 2001” or “an application for labor certification under 
section 1182(a)(5)(A) be filed “on or before such date”). 
 74. President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72 (“I encourage the Congress to consider 
whether there was adequate time for persons eligible under section 245(i) to apply for adjustment of 
status before the filing deadline expired yesterday. . . . I would support legislation that temporarily 
extends the recently expired April 30, 2001 filing deadline”). 
 75. Id. (“Information indicates an estimated 200,000 were eligible to file but did not meet the 
deadline.  Preliminary reports suggest that many applicants were unable to complete their 
paperwork in time, due in part to the fact that the rules explaining how the provision would be 
applied were not issued until late March.”). 
 76. See Charles C. Foster, 1996 Immigration Act: Its Impact on U.S. Legal Residents and 
Undocumented Aliens, 34-FEB HOUS. LAW. 28, 31 (1997) (predicting the effect of the bars).  The 
author provides a useful interpretation of the new law from a senior immigration practitioner’s 
perspective: 
[T]hose who do stay here illegally will have virtually no hope of ever qualifying for legal 
status. Such three-year and 10- year bar provision [sic] will virtually eliminate their 
ability, as a practical matter, to ever qualify for legal status by making what is an almost 
impossible task for many today completely impossible. 
Id. 
 77. Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4, at 3. 
 78. Lofgren, supra note 49, at 361. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Tisha T. Tallman, Liberty, Justice, and Equality: An Examination of Past, Present, and 
Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 869, 891 (2005) 
(concluding that an effective legalization plan must simultaneously consider immigration 
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subverts the highly politicized issue of amnesty and sets the debate in a 
somewhat even-handed tone.81  Despite these avid attempts to keep the 
focus off of amnesty, the issue has continually resurfaced as the central 
obstacle preventing reform efforts.82 
The ebb and flow of immigration laws presents a contentious 
illustration of political climates.83  Immigration policy debates surface in 
times of political and economic hardship.84  American citizens and 
enforcement).  A strategy that combines legalization with law enforcement and border security 
measures is the central premise of comprehensive immigration reform.  Id.  See also Press Release, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-10.html (couching the 
legalization element, while emphasizing enhanced security measures: “There is a rational middle 
ground between granting an automatic path to citizenship for every illegal immigrant and a program 
of mass deportation.”). 
 81. See id. (noting that the press release makes an obvious attempt to detract from the 
legalization element, and clearly denounces amnesty, while acknowledging that enhanced security 
measures alone are inadequate to address the undocumented immigrants currently present within the 
U.S: “We Must Deal With The Millions Of Illegal Immigrants Who Are Already Here”). 
 82. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Employment-Based Immigration: Legislative and Administrative 
Update, 1566 PLI/Corp 9, 11 (2006) (explaining the current developments in immigration law: “The 
central issue of the immigration reform debate this past year is whether reform should include 
stricter enforcement of our laws with greater penalties for violations, or whether reform should 
include a way to legalize the currently undocumented workforce and provide a future flow of 
additional low-skilled workers.” ).   See also, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 
1986 Haunts the Current Immigration Bills in Congress, N.Y. TIMES,  May 23, 2006, at A20 
(chronicling lawmakers’ focus on enacting amnesty legislation); see also, e.g., Paul Nussbaum, 
Across U.S. Ballots Loaded with Issues; The Questions, From Stem Cells to Mourning Doves, May 
Also Pull in Votes for Candidates, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2006, at A01 (quoting Jeffrey 
Makin, Are Ballot Propositions Spilling Over into Candidate Elections?, 2 INITIATIVE & 
REFERENDUM INST. REPORT 5 (2006), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%202006-
2%20Spillovers.pdf) ("Gay marriage, stem-cell research, abortion, minimum wage, immigration and 
affirmative action may be candidate-defining issues.").  See also Nicholas R. Montorio, Note, The 
Issue of Mexican Immigration: Where Do We Go From Here?, 6 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 169, 198-200 
(2007) (highlighting the amnesty debate as a central aspect of the current dilemma). 
 83. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented 
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 1014-15.   See also Hines, supra note 49, 
at 39 (stating: “[i]mmigration law is as much an analysis of political, social, and economic trends as 
the study of a specialized body of law”); see also Senator Edward Kennedy, Introduction to U.S. 
Immigration Law and Policy: 1952-1979; A Report Prepared at the Request of Senator Edward 
Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, upon the Formation of the 
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 3 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 95, 98 
(1979-1980) (prefacing a report on immigration policy by acknowledging the political ramifications 
of the issue: “One of the oldest themes in our history has now become one of our most contentious 
issues.”). 
 84. JOHN ISBISTER, THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 200 (Kumarian Press 1996) (examining the 
different elements that factor in to immigration debates: “It is no coincidence that the expansive 
Immigration Act of 1990 was passed at the end of a decade of steady economic growth, increasing 
prosperity for many Americans (although not all) and falling employment.”).  Bosniak, supra note 
83, at 993 (observing how the current political situation has provoked an acute interest in 
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political representatives alike have long been divided by this 
fundamental legal issue of how to treat undocumented immigrants.85  It 
strikes at the core of political sentiments because it reflects one’s world 
view, economic status, and racial identity.86  Given the political 
significance of the debate, reaching a pragmatic compromise has at 
times seemed impossible.87  Instead of compromise, the issue has 
pushed voters and their representatives in Congress to radical ends.88  
The critical difference in how voters on both sides of the issue have 
interpreted the concept of amnesty provides valuable insight into the 
obstacles that have prevented Congress from drafting meaningful 
immigration reform.89 
While Americans may be starkly divided on whether to allow 
undocumented immigrants to adjust status, the need and desire for 
effective control of our borders is a widely accepted consensus in the 
immigration law:  “The tragedy of September 11th and its aftermath further reinforce the political 
nature of this area of law.”); see also Doris Meissner, Immigration in the Post 9-11 Era, 40 
BRANDEIS L.J. 851, 851 (2002) (discussing immigration from a post 9-11 perspective, in which 
security issues dominate).  Meissner served as the Commissioner of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service from 1993-2000.  Id. at 859.  See also Aristide R. Zolberg, Reforming the 
Back Door: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in Historical Perspective, in 
IMMIGRATION RECONSIDERED: HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY, AND POLITICS 336 (Virginia Yans-
McLaughlin ed., 1990) (categorizing illegal immigration as the back door and noting how economic 
conditions inspire political debate:  “Movements to close the ‘back door’ do tend to broaden their 
base of support in periods of depression and unemployment, when economic insecurity is more 
widespread.”). 
 85. U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions, supra note 38; see infra note 92 and accompanying 
text. 
 86. See Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy: 
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49 
EMORY L.J. 623, 639  (2000) (identifying the economic factors that control the political willingness 
to legislate sensitive immigration issues, particularly enforcement measures for undocumented 
workers). 
 87. See JOHN POWELL, IMMIGRATION 48 (Facts on File 2007) (“Given the strong partisan 
divisions in the American electorate, it is still not clear whether Democrats and Republicans in the 
U.S. Congress can find enough common ground to pass comprehensive reform.”). 
 88. See, e.g., infra note 103 and accompanying text (demonstrating the radical difference 
between the immigration reform legislation passed in the House of Representatives and the Senate). 
 89. U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, A Report to Congress (U. S. Gov. 
Printing, Washington, DC, 1994), Executive Summary, available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.html [hereinafter U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring 
Credibility] (reporting the findings of a nine-member bipartisan body, chaired by former 
Congresswoman Barbara C. Jordan) (“more needs to be done to guarantee that the stated goals of 
our immigration policy are met.  The immediate need is more effective prevention and deterrence of 
unlawful immigration.”).  See Immigration’s Lost Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A24 (“One 
of the many signs of the hysteria accompanying this election season is the way their moderate 
approach to immigration [Republican support of the failed Senate Bill S. 2611] has been tarred as 
wholesale “amnesty” for lawbreakers.”). 
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aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks.90  The post-9/11 fear of 
terrorism incited a mass of legislation introduced by members of both 
parties to secure our Nation.91  The present immigration debate is 
therefore not a question of whether to address the issue.92  Rather it is a 
question of how to address the issue.93  Given the importance of 
improving security, it remains imperative to any practical solution that 
we first address the issue of what to do with the unaccounted-for 
population of immigrants already within the United States.94 
Fundamental issues such as streamlining a complicated and 
fragmented bureaucracy, developing efficient and effective services, and 
determining how to prevent terrorists from passing through our borders 
undetected will not fairly be addressed until Congress establishes some 
 90. HING, supra note 17, at 50 (providing a thorough analysis of how legalization would 
effectively address our national security concerns: “By offering a program that would encourage 
undocumented workers to come forward, we would be able to conduct background checks on a 
large group that currently lives underground, while freeing up investigative resources to concentrate 
on real threats of terror at the border and within our borders.”); see Jeffrey L. Ehrenpreis, Note, 
Controlling Our Borders Through Enhanced Employer Sanctions, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1203-
04 (2006) (citing Nightline: Illegal Immigrant Workers (ABC television broadcast Dec. 14, 2004) 
(transcript on file with the Southern California Law Review) (quoting Senator John  McCain on the 
security concerns posed by undocumented immigrants: “[W]e can't tell the American people that 
we're winning the war on terror if hundreds of thousands or millions of people are coming across 
our border every year, illegally and undocumented.”).  See also Bradly J. Condon & J. Brad 
McBride, Do You Know the Way to San José? Resolving the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration 
to the United States, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251, 254 (2003) (“The debate over how to address the 
issue of migrant Mexican workers in the United States is not new.  The literature in this field tends 
to divide along pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant lines.  However, all agree that reforms are 
needed.”) see also Regina Germain, PANEL DISCUSSION: Perspectives on the Bush 
Administration's New Immigrant Guestworker Proposal: The Time For Immigration Reform Is 
Now, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 747, 751 (2004) (“A comprehensive immigration reform bill will 
be enacted in the near future. The question is not if there will be a new law, but when it will pass.”). 
 91. See, e.g., H.R. 10, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 5024, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 5040, 108th 
Cong. (2004); H.R. 5161, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2774, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2845, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (each addressing the recommendations put forth by the 9/11 Commission Report). 
 92. U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions, supra note 38 (asserting the need for Congressional 
action: “The status quo is not acceptable.  It must be replaced with sound immigration reforms that 
provide a manageable and orderly system where legality is the prevailing rule.”).  See also 
Cristopher J. Walker, Border Vigilantism and Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 10 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 135, 173 (2007) (asserting: “‘Comprehensive immigration reform’ is on the mind 
of federal, state, and local lawmakers, and changes to the current system will be made.”) 
 93. Id. (“These are complicated issues, and they deserve careful consideration and debate.”) 
 94. See Hines, supra note 49, at 28 (recognizing the need for a legalization program to 
address security concerns). See also Meissner, supra note 84, at 852 (identifying a shift in 
immigration policy post-9/11: “Seeing immigration as fundamentally an economy-driven 
phenomenon and looking to economics as the conceptual model through which we should be 
making changes for the future is, at least for the moment, on the sidelines.”).  The “security lens” 
through which Meissner examined immigration in 2002 has continued to dominate these debates.  
See Hines, supra note 49, at 28 
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level of understanding on how to approach the twelve million 
undocumented immigrants95 currently living and working in the United 
States. 96 
Congress’ recent attempts to draft comprehensive immigration 
reform measures97 have provided a welcome look at a flawed system.98  
In anticipation of the 2006 mid-term elections, politicians seized the 
opportunity to distinguish themselves by taking a stance on immigration 
reform.99  The media inflamed the debates and protesters marched in 
large numbers to oppose the proposals100 considered by Congress.101  
 95. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 96. See generally Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step 
Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 205-332 (2002) (proposing procedural 
reforms to immigration laws); see also infra note 185 and accompanying text (recommending 
comprehensive immigration reform to fix the myriad of problems with the current system). 
 97. LoBreglio, supra note 45 at 952-54 (commenting on a 2004 directive to revise 
immigration laws and concluding that meaningful reform requires a comprehensive approach).  The 
author examined the history of immigration reform bills and noted similarities with the 2004 
legislation.  Id. 
 98. See Immigration Enforcement:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border 
Security and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Richard 
M. Stana). 
 99. E.g., Carl Hulse, In Bellweather District G.O.P. Runs on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6, 2006, at A1; see also Mercedes Olivera, Latino Voters May Color State Blue – In Time, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 28, 2006, at 2B (observing the potential impact of Latino voters on the 2006 
mid-term elections and identifying immigration as a key issue: “Republican hard-liners have led the 
immigration debate around the country.”). 
 100. For pro-immigrant groups, much of the House Bill seemed outrageous.  National 
Immigration Law Center (NILC), How H.R. 4437 Would Criminalize Immigrants, 
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/hr4437immcriminalized_2006-2-28.pdf (last visited 
January 21, 2007).  Two of the most objectionable measures were the ones which would have made 
it a crime to provide humanitarian aid to an undocumented immigrant and the provision which 
would have made undocumented immigrants automatic felons.  Id.; Allen Thomas O'Rourke, Note, 
Good Samaritans, Beware: The Sensenbrenner-King Bill and Assistance to Undocumented 
Migrants, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 195, 197-201 (2006).  The NILC website pronounces the 
mission of the organization is to “protect and promote the rights and opportunities of low-income 
immigrants and their family members.”  NILC Home, http://www.nilc.org/index.htm (last visited 
January 21, 2007). 
 101. HING, supra note 17, at 8-9 (chronicling the media coverage that propelled the “furor over 
illegal immigration”); Allan Chernoff, Rallies across U.S. call for illegal immigrant rights; 
Hundreds of thousands join 'national day of action' in towns, cities, Apr. 10, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/10/immigration/index.html;  see, e.g., Senate Passes Two 
Immigration Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at A25, and A G.O.P. Split on Immigration 
Vexes a Senator, N. Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006 (providing examples of the extensive media coverage 
of the issue and commenting on the protestors who marched outside the capitol); see, e.g., Carl 
Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, The Immigration Debate: Congress; Divisions Remain As Bush Presses on 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at A1 (discussing the ensuing debates over amnesty and 
identifying resistance from conservatives on Bush’s proposals). 
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Unfortunately, the 109th Congress abandoned the project.102  Legislation 
put forth by the House of Representatives has differed sharply from 
measures proposed by the Senate.103 
In December 2005, the Sensenbrenner Bill, passed by the House of 
Representatives, provided the catalyst for the most recent wave of 
immigration reform.104  The Sensenbrenner Bill took an enforcement-
only approach, which did not include any legalization or guest worker 
provisions.105  For immigrants and their advocates, this legislation was 
purely xenophobic.106  In response, masses across the country marched 
 102. See Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64, at 5-7 (statement of Rep. 
Berman).  Even before Congress failed to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill 
Representative Berman predicted that the hearings were designed to delay such action: “I am 
convinced by virtue of what has happened here, both in treating the House-passed bill, what it went 
through, and in the way people are titling and talking about the hearings in the Senate on the Senate 
bill, that this is simply a well-orchestrated effort to have this Congress recess before the election 
without having dealt with one of the country’s most serious national crises.”  Id. at 7.  Even 
President Bush, who has been an avid advocate of comprehensive immigration reform, has been 
accused of stalling action for political gain.  Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Senate Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Comm. 
On Senate Judiciary).  Senator Leahy said of the President, “Instead of urging his party to take early 
and decisive action to pass comprehensive immigration reform, as he signaled he would in February 
2001, the President began his second term campaigning to undercut the protections of our Social 
Security system.”  Id; cf. Frei, supra note 41, at 1358 (coming to President Bush’s defense by 
acknowledging his consistent push for immigration reform: “In the months following the election, 
President Bush has made clear that his guest-worker proposal was not simply election-time rhetoric 
by continuing to lobby Congress to approve a system that would dramatically change the face of 
United States immigration law and policy toward Latin Americans.”). 
 103. Compare S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006) with H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006).  The House 
bill focused exclusively on law enforcement and enhanced border security without any legalization 
plan.  H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006).  The Senate bill, while also including increased border 
security and law enforcement, also proposed a path to citizenship as part of a temporary guest 
worker program.  S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006).  This effort to pass a legalization provision stood out 
as the critical difference between the two bills.  Fragomen, supra note 82 and accompanying text.   
See generally ISBISTER, supra note 84, at 200 (observing that “in times of economic hardship, 
politicians can advance their careers by striking out against immigrants.”). 
 104. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 
4437, 109th Cong. (2005).  For a summary of the proposed law see American Immigration Lawyers 
Association, The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 
(H.R. 4437), as Amended and Passed by the House on 12/16/05, Section-by-Section Analysis, 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=18258 (last visited January 21, 2007). 
 105. H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006); O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 197-201 (providing 
background information and explanation of the basic provisions in H.R. 4437). 
 106. See Edwin R. Rubin, Toward an Immigration Policy for the 21st Century: A Plea for a 
Thoughtful, Fact-Based Debate, 167 N.J.L.J. 51, 52 (2005) (identifying the xenophobic nature of 
contemporary immigration discussions).  The policies narrowly tailored towards those entering from 
the Southern Border seemed to target Latinos.  Id.  For those most deeply troubled by the bill it 
resembled the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.  See generally Frei, supra note 41 (identifying the 
Chinese Exclusion Act as the first immigration law to exclude a specific race of people because of 
their failure to assimilate).   
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in large numbers, drawing attention to some of the particularly radical 
aspects of the bill.107 
In March 2006, a compromise bill passed in the Senate, advancing 
a more liberalized approach to immigration reform.108  This measure 
incorporated President Bush’s recommendations by adopting a guest 
worker program and a means for undocumented immigrants to legalize 
 107. O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 201 (describing one of the most radical parts of the Act: 
“[w]hile many sections of House Bill 4437 have created controversy, the most troubling portion 
directly affects not undocumented migrants but the millions of ordinary citizens and residents who 
treat them like neighbors.  Section 202 prohibits assisting an undocumented migrant to reside in the 
United States and carries severe criminal penalties.”).  H.R. 4437 § 202, 107th Cong. (2006). 
SEC. 202. ALIEN SMUGGLING AND RELATED OFFENSES.  Section 274 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324) is amended to read as follows: 'ALIEN 
SMUGGLING AND RELATED OFFENSES' SEC. 274. (a) Criminal Offenses and 
Penalties-(1) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES- Whoever--(A) assists, encourages, directs, or 
induces a person to come to or enter the United States, or to attempt to come to or enter 
the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien 
who lacks lawful authority to come to or enter the United States; (B) assists, encourages, 
directs, or induces a person to come to or enter the United States at a place other than a 
designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, regardless of whether such person has official permission or lawful authority to 
be in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is 
an alien; (C) assists, encourages, directs, or induces a person to reside in or remain in the 
United States, or to attempt to reside in or remain in the United States, knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to 
reside in or remain in the United States; (D) transports or moves a person in the United 
States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks 
lawful authority to enter or be in the United States, where the transportation or 
movement will aid or further in any manner the person's illegal entry into or illegal 
presence in the United States; (E) harbors, conceals, or shields from detection a person in 
the United States knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien 
who lacks lawful authority to be in the United States; (F) transports, moves, harbors, 
conceals, or shields from detection a person outside of the United States knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien in unlawful transit from one 
country to another or on the high seas, under circumstances in which the person is in fact 
seeking to enter the United States without official permission or lawful authority; or (G) 
conspires or attempts to commit any of the preceding acts, shall be punished as provided 
in paragraph (2), regardless of any official action which may later be taken with respect 
to such alien. (2) CRIMINAL PENALTIES- A person who violates the provisions of 
paragraph (1) shall-- (A) except as provided in subparagraphs (D) through (H), in the 
case where the offense was not committed for commercial advantage, profit, or private 
financial gain, be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined under title 18, United 
States Code, or both. 
Id. 
 108. S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006); POWELL, supra note 87, at 48 (identifying the Senate bill as 
a compromise measure: “By the time the Senate opened debate on March 31, it appeared that a 
compromise measure was within reach, potentially legalizing millions of illegal immigrants who 
had been in the United States for more than two years and including a guest-worker program.”). 
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status.109  Senate Bill S.2611 demonstrated Congressional support for 
the concept of legalizing the existing population of undocumented 
workers already in the country.110  The immigration debates that 
emerged in response to the proposal centered around the political divide 
over legalization 111
After months of front-page headlines, the Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Bill envisioned by President George W. Bush 
quietly disappeared from major news streams.112  Congressional 
determination to reform immigration was a campaign selling point,113 
which proved to be a false promise when Congress adopted the Secure 
Fence Act of 2006.114  This legislation fails the millions of 
undocumented immigrants who anticipated significant changes to 
immigration laws.115  The Secure Fence Act narrowly addresses the 
 109. S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006); Fragomen, supra note 82, at 16 (explaining the three-tiered 
system of legalization which passed as part of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, 
S.2611).  The bill has been heavily criticized for its complexity.  Id.  The first tier comprises guest 
workers, working on a temporary basis, but with the possibility of permanent legal status after five 
years.  Id.  The second tier would apply to immigrants who have been in the country for two to five 
years.  Id.  The third tier would permit undocumented workers who have lived in the United States 
for five years or more.  Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Rachel L. Swarns, A G.O.P. Split on Immigration Vexes a Senator, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 2006, at 11 (noting legalization as the central issue: “The legislative battle has pitted Republican 
against Republican, with conservatives deriding guest worker programs as an amnesty for 
lawbreakers and calling for a wall to be built along the border with Mexico, and with business 
leaders pushing for legalization of the illegal workforce. . . .”). 
 112. See e.g., Immigration’s Lost Year, supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 113. Makin, supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64, at 7-8.  Rep. Berman 
objected to the hearings on the grounds that no legitimate purpose was served by them: 
These hearings are a con-job on the American people.  The Republican majority in the 
House is trying to convince the American public that they want very badly to enact 
immigration reform and they just need to study it a little bit more in these hearings 
before they can get the job done. 
Id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Berman, Member, Judiciary Committee).  Rep. Logren echoed these 
concerns: “I believe we are talking a lot once again.  We are going to talk all over the country once 
again, but I think it is all talk and no action.  Talk is cheap, but I think that the American public is 
going to see through this sham . . . .”  Id. at 11 (statement by Rep. Lofgren, Member, H. Judiciary 
Comm., Subcomm. on Immigration, Borders and Claims).  Rep. Sanchez explained how the process 
itself would have to take a different direction to produce results: “[i]n the history of Congress, the 
House has never held hearings on a Senate-passed bill before going to conference.  If this body is 
truly serious about enacting much-needed border enforcement plus immigration reform legislation, 
they should convene a conference that is fair and bipartisan.”  Id. at 13 (statement by Rep. Sanchez, 
Member, H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Immigration, Borders and Claims). 
 115. While the 109th Congress did pass immigration legislation, it can hardly be said to have 
addressed the concerns that had been debated in the hearings.  See infra notes 117 and 126 
(illustrating the difference between the Secure Fences Act and comprehensive immigration reform).  
See also Makin, supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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issue of border security while ignoring the interrelated immigration 
issues that effective border security demands.116  Entirely contrary to the 
comprehensive reform urged by President Bush and echoed by 
Congress,117 the resulting legislation focuses on measures that have 
proven ineffective over the last two decades.118 
Without additional measures, this attempt to secure the physical 
border is unlikely to achieve the desired result of controlling illegal 
immigration.119  The forces that compel illegal entry and stay have 
historically continued to exert considerable influence over immigration 
patterns regardless of border enforcement.120  If the massive border 
 116. See Immigration Reform in Pieces, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A22 (noting the 
contradiction between President Bush’s resolve to reform immigration comprehensively and the 
“pre-election lineup of narrow enforcement measures packaged to give voters a false impression of 
resolve”); see also It Isn’t Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2006, at A22 (criticizing the idea of 
abandoning comprehensive immigration reform for an enforcement-only approach: “[t]he 
alternatives to the Specter bill are senseless.  The enforcement-only approach – building a 700-mile 
wall and engaging in a campaign of mass deportation and harassment to rip 12 million people from 
the national fabric – would be an impossible waste of time and resources.  It would destroy families 
and weaken the economy.”). 
 117. Compare Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Improving Worksite 
Enforcement, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.C.C.A.N., (emphasizing the 
importance of comprehensive reform that addresses the entire range of issues, rather than individual 
aspects exclusively), with Fact Sheet: The Secure Fence Act of 2006, The White House, Office of 
Comm’cns, [hereinafter Secure Fence Act Fact Sheet] (accepting a single piece of legislation as a 
starting point: “Earlier this year, the President laid out a strategy for comprehensive immigration 
reform.  The Secure Fence Act is one part of this reform, and the President will work with Congress 
to finish the job and pass the remaining elements of this strategy.”). 
 118. The Budgetary Impact of Current and Proposed Burden Security and Immigration 
Policies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Paul R. 
Cullinan, Chief, Human Resources Cost Estimates Unit).  The report concludes that funding alone 
cannot solve the flow of illegal immigration:  
In recent years, funding for border security has risen sharply, but it has not kept sizable 
numbers of illegal migrants from entering the country or many legal migrants from 
overstaying their visas.  Although the United States has nearly doubled the number of its 
border patrol agents over the past decade, a large flow of immigrants continues to enter 
the United States illegally.   
Id.   See also infra note 204 and accompanying text (criticizing an enforcement-only approach by 
positing it as the antithesis of comprehensive reform). 
 119. Dunne, supra note 86 at 640 (identifying four possible explanations for why there is a 
recognized gap between proposals and practical effects of immigration policies). 
 120. President Ronald Reagan in 1986 and President Bill Clinton in 1996 dramatically 
enhanced border security efforts to no avail.  JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the 
Southwest Border From Reagan Through Clinton, 1981-2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601, 614-17 
(2002).  In 1986, President Reagan signed IRCA, which authorized fifty percent increases in 
personnel for the consecutive years of 1987 and 1988.  Id.  In 1996, President Clinton signed the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which authorized 
hiring an additional 1,000 Border Patrol agents every year until 2001.  Id.  In addition, Attorney 
General Janet Reno’s five-part border enforcement plan, announced in 1994, provided for a massive 
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security overhauls of the 1980’s and 1990’s had any effect at all it was to 
propel illegal immigration further.121 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that the increased border 
security deterred immigrants from exiting the country.122  Many of the 
immigrants who enter the United States for work perpetually return 
home, continuing a pattern of entering and exiting in a cyclical 
fashion.123  Undocumented immigrants who are currently present are 
less likely to leave even temporarily if they know that exiting will 
jeopardize their opportunity to 124
overhaul of the border security tactics.  Id.  Despite these concerted efforts to curtail unreported 
border traffic, the population of undocumented immigrants doubled during President Clinton’s term.  
Id. 
 121. LoBreglio, supra note 45, at 949-53 (analyzing the Border Security and Immigration 
Improvement Act, a proposed immigration reform bill, by comparison to earlier attempts to revise 
the law).  The author commented on the failure of IRCA: “In 1992 . . . the Commission on 
Agricultural Workers reported that, despite the IRCA amendments to the INA, illegal immigration 
had continued to rise, working conditions for farm workers had continued to decline, and the rate of 
unemployment for domestic agricultural workers remained high.”  Id. at 949-50.  The author also 
summarized the ineffectiveness of IIRIRA: “Despite an increase in arrests along the border, the 
IIRIRA, like so many other reforms before it, failed to produce a dramatic downturn in illegal 
immigration.  Immigration and naturalization statistics approximate that during Clinton’s presidency 
the number of illegal aliens coming to the United States had increased at a rate of 300,000 per year 
and that by July of 2000, there were six million illegal immigrants residing here.” Id. at 952. 
 122. Camille J. Bosworth, Note, Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis of President Bush’s 
Proposed Reform, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1106 (2005).  Bosworth summarizes how increased 
border security can cause the number of undocumented immigrants to grow: 
Whereas in the beginning migrants came seasonally and then returned home with their 
earnings, workers now stay longer and often settle permanently in the United States.  
This is largely a result of the increasing risk associated with crossing the border.  As the 
costs of crossing the border illegally rise, temporary workers remain in the United States 
longer rather than risk being apprehended at the border when they decide to return. 
Id. 
 123. See Richard C. Jones, Macro-Patterns of Undocumented Migration between Mexico and 
the U.S., in PATTERNS OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION; MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 34 
(Richard C. Jones ed., Rowman & Allanheld 1984) (describing the characteristics of a typical 
undocumented migrant: “He spends six months to a year in the U.S. before returning to Mexico, and 
makes four or five such trips in a lifetime.”); see also Nicole Jacoby, Note, America’s De Facto 
Guest Workers: Lessons From Germany’s Gastarbeiter for U.S. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1569, 1608 (2004) (commenting on the cyclical pattern of Mexican migration: “Mexican 
workers rarely migrate to the United States with the intent of becoming permanent settlers.”).  
Mexican migrants comprise the majority of undocumented immigrants in the United States.  
Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without 
Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) (defining undocumented immigrants as a 
class of people: “Undocumented immigrants that enter the United States without authorization are 
primarily Mexicans and Central Americans that cross into the United States from Mexico.  Between 
70 to 85% of Mexican immigrants that entered the United States since 1990 did not have valid 
documentation in 2004.”). 
 124. Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, President of the Migration Policy Institute, Address 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Mar. 23, 2004), 
23
Siegel: Amnesty in Immigration Policy
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
SIEGEL_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:25 PM 
314 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:291 
 
The most compelling flaw of the Secure Fence Act, which focuses 
exclusively on increased border security, is that efforts to augment 
border security will do nothing to remove or incorporate the twelve 
million undocumented immigrants125 who currently live and work 
throughout the United States.126  The mere existence of these 
undocumented persons presents an obvious security challenge for the 
U.S. government.127  While mass deportation is often suggested as a 
remedy to this problem,128 realistically it is not an option that will 
ameliorate the situation.129 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/PapademetriouTestimony040323.pdf, at 3.  The 
Congressional address identifies this critical failure in immigration policy: “it is Mexico’s (and to a 
much lesser extent, Central America’s) tradition of circular migration that can be most accurately 
described as having been most directly ‘disrupted’ by the US border enforcement policies of the 
past 10 or so years.”  Id. 
 125. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Brian R. Wahlquist, Note, Slamming the Door on Terrorists and the Drug Trade 
While Increasing Legal Immigration: Temporary Deployment of the United States Military at the 
Borders, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 551, 552 (2005) (“Border security and immigration are two separate 
issues.”); see also Secure Fence Act Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 2 (explaining that while 
President Bush supported the increased border security measures, he made clear that it failed to 
address the undocumented immigrants already in the country: “Comprehensive immigration reform 
requires that we face the reality that millions of illegal immigrants are here already.”).  See, e.g., 
H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006) (noting this proposed legislation is just one of many attempts to 
regulate immigration through law enforcement strategies).  In addition to increased deportations, a 
law enforcement strategy may also take an indirect approach via the employers who hire 
undocumented immigrants.  H.R. 4437 is an example of such combined efforts to stop illegal 
immigration.  This strategy reflects the push-pull philosophy of illegal immigration.  See Senator 
Alan K. Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and the National 
Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 147, 154-55 (1984).  See also U.S. Immigration Policy: 
Restoring Credibility, supra note 89.  By closing off the forces that pull undocumented immigrants 
into the country, legislators believe they can deter them from entering and/or staying in the United 
States. Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of 2005: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of John N. Hostettler, Chairman) [hereinafter Illegal 
Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act Hearing].  “The legislation is based 
upon the understanding that we will only be able to assert control over illegal immigration when we 
can turn off the ‘job magnet’ that draws most illegal aliens to our country.  As almost half of all 
illegal aliens resident in the U.S. came to the U.S. legally on temporary visas, border controls alone 
will never be sufficient.”  Id. 
 127. Tallman, supra note 80 at 890 (“Common sense dictates that integrating 9.3 million 
undocumented, unknown immigrants into our society will address any existing national security 
concerns regarding their presence.  Introducing or passing legislation that seeks to limit their access 
to services, benefits, or privileges does nothing in regards to knowing who they are or integrating 
them into our society.”). 
 128. See Rajeen Goyle & David A. Jaeger, Deporting the Undocumented: A Cost Assessment 
(Center for American Progress, Washington, D.C. 2005) at 1, available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/deporting_the_undocumented.pdf.  The report prefaces the 
findings by outlining the competing approaches on how to impact the number of undocumented 
immigrants: 
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Several practical problems restrict the government from actually 
removing all undocumented immigrants from the United States.130  The 
geographic expanse of the country, the number of undocumented 
immigrants present, and the limited financial resources available do not 
permit an undertaking of such magnitude.131  Even if undocumented 
immigrants are returned to their home countries, they are likely to return 
regardless of increased border security measures.132 
Developing a comprehensive solution to the rising population of 
undocumented immigrants requires a compassionate understanding of 
the root causes that feed the problem.133  In addition to the disparity in 
  The political debate over immigration reform remains stymied over the question of 
illegal immigration.  . . . [r]esolving the status of the undocumented has become the 
principal obstacle to achieving consensus on reform. 
  Most legislative proposals address the situation by providing some form of legal 
recognition for the undocumented.  Yet a number of people, including members of 
Congress, favor a more draconian solution to the problem — a severe crackdown on 
illegal immigration not only against those attempting to cross the border, but also the 
deportation of the entire undocumented population currently living in the United States. 
Id. at 1. 
 129. This Month in Immigration History: May 1987, 
http://149.101.23.2/graphics/aboutus/history/may1987.html. The United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service website describes mass deportation as an impractical solution to the 
undocumented immigrant population: 
At the beginning of the 21st Century, it is not at all clear that it is possible or even 
desirable to try to find and then deport all undocumented migrants currently in the U.S., 
nor to adopt and then implement the stringent measures that would be needed to prevent 
the continued arrival of additional undocumented aliens each year and deter others from 
over-staying their legal authorizations. 
Id. 
 130. Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a Comprehensive 
Approach that Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to Secure the Border, 43 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 273 (2006) (projecting that it would take centuries for the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to deport the entire population of undocumented immigrants 
currently present in the country at the present rate of 3,000 appeals adjudicated per month and 
acknowledging the limitations of the “already strained” immigration budget).  Representative Sheila 
Jackson Lee is the ranking member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security and Claims.  Id. at 267, n. a1. 
 131. Id.; Goyle & Jaeger, supra note 128, at 1 (estimating the cost of a mass deportation at 
$206-230 billion over five years).  The report provides an objective analysis of the cost using 
publicly available data.  Id. 
 132. See Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act Hearing, supra 
note 126 and accompanying text. A vast number of undocumented immigrants are overstays who 
entered legally, but failed to achieve legal status before their visas expired.  Id. 
 133. U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, supra note 89.  The Executive Summary 
urges immigration reform to concentrate on the root causes of undocumented immigration: 
Migrants enter and remain unlawfully in the United States for a variety of reasons. Few 
migrants take the decision to leave their countries lightly. Generally, a combination of 
"push" and "pull" factors contribute to these movements. Many of the recommendations 
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wealth between the United States and the countries where undocumented 
immigrants originate,134 there is the problem of bureaucratic borders.135  
Any foreign national desiring to reside permanently in the United States 
faces serious legal obstacles.136  Even professional athletes and 
multimillionaires face immigration challenges.137  An immigration 
system that remains difficult and unpredictable for this elite population 
is even less approachable for economically dependent immigrants.138  
Processing an application for legal permanent residence is simply too 
complicated and costly to realistically serve undocumented immigrants 
as a credible alternative to unlawful border crossings or visa 
overstays.139 
in this report aim to reduce the pull of both jobs and of ineffective immigration 
enforcement. On the push side, lack of employment, low wages and poor working 
conditions, separation from family members, political, social and religious repression, 
civil conflict, and other problems motivate people to leave their homes. Any effective 
strategy to prevent unlawful migration must address these causes. 
Id. See also Amanda E. Schreyer, Note, Human Smuggling Across the U.S.-Mexico Border: U.S. 
Laws Are Not Stopping It, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 795, 814 (2006) (opining that human smuggling 
from Mexico to the United States must be addressed by focusing on the underlying causes). 
 134. Condon & McBride, supra note 90, at 256 (“There is significant evidence that additional 
guest worker programs, as well as broad-based amnesties and legalization of illegal immigrants 
already in the destination country, serve to stimulate further illegal immigration if there is not a 
simultaneous and significant improvement of living standards in the originating country.”). 
 135. Benson, supra note 96, at 206 (“In part, our ‘illegal immigration’ problems result from the 
prospective immigrant’s inability to understand and rely upon our legal immigration system.”). 
 136. See Raymond E. Wiest, External Dependency and the Perpetuation of Temporary 
Migration in the United States, in PATTERNS OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION; MEXICO AND THE 
UNITED STATES 110-35 (Richard C. Jones ed., 1984) (explaining how undocumented migration 
perpetuates an economic dependency that feeds itself). 
 137. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(iii) (West 2006) (I.N.A. § 212) (outlining the complicated 
set of restrictions on labor certification for professional athletes), and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(b)(5)(A) 
(West 2006) (I.N.A. § 203) (requiring a significant investment of capital and an assurance of job 
creation for an immigrant investor visa); see also Ronald R. Rose, Fixing the Wheel: A Critical 
Analysis of the Immigrant Investor Visa, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 615, 621 (1992) (explaining the 
ineffectiveness of visas that target multimillionaire investors: “Less than ten percent of the available 
visas are being issued.”). 
 138. See Yale-Loehr & Palmer, supra note 50, at 9 (guiding attorneys on unlawful presence 
and concluding: “Unlawful presence remains as confusing as ever.  Four years after enactment, the 
INS still has not published implementing regulations to explain definitively when the three- and ten-
year bars do and don’t apply.  In the meantime, practitioners must muddle along, making do with 
various memos and administrative cases they can find.”). 
 139. REFORMING IMMIGRATION; HELPING MEET AMERICA’S NEED FOR A SKILLED 
WORKFORCE: A STATEMENT ON NATIONAL POLICY BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF 
THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2 (Committee for Economic Development 2001).  
The report summarizes its findings on immigration policy by acknowledging that a failed system 
creates a disincentive for immigrants to enter legally: 
[T]he current permanent visa system, with its predominant emphasis on family 
unification, fails to address our long-term workforce needs for permanent and higher 
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Immigrants who risk their lives to cross the border without 
inspection are usually reacting to an immediate economic need.140  
Compliance with extremely complicated and unpredictable immigration 
laws141 is not an option for immigrants who lack the financial means to 
even begin the process.142  For these immigrants the choice is not 
whether to follow the law, but whether or not to enter.143 
Optimal immigration laws must take account of the effect they have 
on illegal immigration.144  If the laws themselves compel circumvention, 
then lawmakers have a duty to correct these barriers.145  Restrictionist 
efforts to decrease the number of undocumented immigrants inflate the 
problem by creating a more deeply subverted class of people 
unrecognized by the law.146 
skilled workers.  Administrative backlogs prevent the issuance of as much as half the 
employment green cards authorized each year, forcing immigrants and employers alike 
to turn to temporary visas as the makeshift rout to eventual permanent status.  As a 
result, both the permanent and temporary admission systems have become dysfunctional.  
Employers and immigrants alike have strong incentives to ‘game the system’ instead of 
playing by the rules. 
Id. 
 140. See Simpson, supra note 126, at 154-55 (describing the “push” and “pull” factors that 
drive illegal immigration).  The main “push” factor that compels these immigrants to leave their 
home countries are economic instability and a lack of jobs.  Id.  See also U.S. Immigration Policy: 
Restoring Credibility, supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 141. Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 37, at 73 (determining immigration to be one of 
the most complicated areas of law, and adding that recent changes have sincerely increased the 
complexity). 
 142. See James R. Edwards, Center for Immigration Studies, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The 
Connection Between Legal and Illegal Immigration (2006), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back106.html (noting that the estimated illegal immigration 
population has tripled since 1980, in spite of the adoption of IRCA in 1986). 
 143. Benson, supra note 96, at 206 (“In part, our ‘illegal immigration’ problems result from the 
prospective immigrant’s inability to understand and rely upon our legal immigration system.”). 
 144. Id.; see Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
41-42 (1984) (describing how our society’s values shape immigration law and delineating the rising 
population of undocumented immigrants as a key issue influencing a policy shift: “Perhaps the 
central fact about immigration with which social policymakers must deal today is the presence of an 
immense population of aliens in the United States in apparent violation of the immigration laws.”). 
 145. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982).  See infra note 168 and accompanying 
text (recognizing the existence of a “shadow population” as a violation of core democratic 
principles); see also U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN 
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY (Report to Congress, 1997) 104, 
available at http:// www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/becoming/full-report.pdf (providing guidance on the 
direction of immigration policy: “As a nation committed to the rule of law, our immigration policies 
must conform to the highest standards of integrity and efficiency in the enforcement of the law.”). 
 146. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After 
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 332-33 (2003) (citing IIRIRA to demonstrate the 
undesirable outcome of increasing immigration restrictions: “[I]mmigration legislation has taken a 
decidedly restrictionist position, resulting in the institutionalization of a permanent class of ‘illegal’ 
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Although motivated by different objectives, the U.S. government, 
U.S. citizens, and undocumented immigrants themselves share a 
common desire to decrease the population of persons deemed “illegal” in 
the United States.147  Given the common purpose of these interest 
groups, the question of whether to allow the present population of 
undocumented immigrants to legalize status must be fairly addressed.148  
While critics of legalization are firmly grounded in the moral obligation 
to punish undocumented immigrants,149 a pragmatic approach 
recognizes that the immigrants themselves need an incentive to come out 
of the shadows.150  Comprehensive immigration reform measures 
attempt to balance these competing objectives by incorporating 
punishment mechanisms alongside the benefit of adjustin 151
While lawmakers have full discretion to expand or retract 
persons and placing them outside protection of the law.”). 
 147. Hearing on How Illegal Immigration Impacts Constituencies: Perspectives From 
Members of Congress (Part II) Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 40 (2005), at 2 [hereinafter Hearing on How Illegal 
Immigration Impacts Constituencies, Part II] (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, New Mexico) (“I think the members of 
Congress can agree on one thing on this issue: The illegal alien situation must be brought under 
control.”). 
 148. See Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64, at 9 (statement of Rep. 
Berman) (urging the necessity of a legalization measure: “[w]ithout some process that deals with the 
legalization of the millions and millions of people in this country now working, and working under 
false identifiers, working in many cases in outrageously inhumane conditions, unless some process 
exists for them to come forward, that kind of a system will never work.”). 
 149. Marah Carter Stith, Immigration Control: A Catholic Dilemma?, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 73, 93 (2007) (relating the desire to punish as a religious ideal: “they may wish to restrict 
benefits to undocumented aliens in order to discourage illegal immigration.”). 
 150. See Neda Mahmoudzadeh, Comment, Love Them, Love Them Not: The Reflection of Anti-
Immigrant Attitudes in Undocumented Immigrant Health Care Law, 9 SCHOLAR 465, 494 (2007) 
(addressing the denial of health care to undocumented immigrants and concluding: “For national 
security purposes, it is crucial to keep count of all non-citizens that enter or are within the United 
States border. However, further isolation and criminalization of those who live in this country 
illegally will certainly not help the process of identifying them.”).  Coercive measures designed to 
propel voluntary departures have historically proven to be the most effective and efficient means of 
decreasing the undocumented immigrant population.  Ehrenpreis, supra note 90, at 1221 
(recommending that immigration laws encourage undocumented immigrants to leave willingly: 
“[t]he most effective way to control illegal immigration is to truly eliminate the pull factor – 
employment opportunities.”). 
 151. See Dennis J. Loiacono & Jillian Maloff, Note, Be Our Guest: Synthesizing a Realistic 
Guest Worker Program as an Element of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 111, 143 (2007).  The authors attempt to synthesize various approaches to the current 
debate.  In concluding that “[a] comprehensive solution is essential to effective and fair immigration 
reform,” the term “comprehensive” appears to be used as a term of art that means a combination of 
enforcement along with legalization.  Id. 
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immigration benefits as they see fit,152 constructing a workable 
immigration system requires creating laws that serve their intended 
purpose.153  A complicated and costly immigration bureaucracy that 
drives illegal immigration is counterproductive154 and not in the best 
interest of our society.155 
Comprehensive immigration reform acknowledges and addresses 
the interdependent relationship between legal and illegal immigration.156  
 152. Contra MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES 46 (Routledge 2001) 
(arguing that all nations have an affirmative duty to grant immigration benefits to migrants who 
enter due to economic necessity: “the idea that its duty is only to its citizens stems from a faulty 
conception of the purpose of the state’s existence . . . .”). 
 153. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 252 (2003) (illustrating the 
ineffectiveness of immigration through a comparison to prohibition: “In sum, strict immigration 
controls that run counter to migration pressures simply cannot be enforced.  As Prohibition has 
shown, law cannot be effectively enforced when it faces social and economic resistance and the 
governed do not view as criminal what the law criminalizes.  Moreover, rampant violation of the 
immigration laws undermines their very legitimacy.”); Jennifer Bosco, Comment, Undocumented 
Immigrants, Economic Justice, and Welfare Reform in California, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 71, 89-90 
(1994) (identifying the futility of immigration laws when there are strong incentives to immigrate 
illegally: “without addressing the factors that push people to immigrate illegally, any immediate 
legal remedies will not be fully effective.”). 
 154. See Katherine L. Vaughns, Symposium: Broken Fences: Legal and Practical Realities of 
Immigration Reform in the Post-9/11 Age: Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections on Fixing the 
Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Changes, 5 U. MD. J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & 
CLASS 151, 167 (2005) (addressing the ineffectiveness of current immigration policy: “At present, 
the legislative initiatives enacted since 1996 have rendered immigration laws so harsh and tough, it 
is not surprising that they are hard to enforce and virtually ignored.”). 
 155. See Bosco, supra note 153, at 81 (arguing that U.S. immigration policy must compensate 
for the unintended effects of the disparity in wealth). 
The United States must also bear responsibilities that go beyond national borders.  
Economic development within the United States frequently has a disastrous effect on the 
natural resources and the stability of so-called developing nations.  Political philosopher 
Judith Lichtenberg argues that we owe an affirmative duty to those whom we make 
worse off: ‘[I]t has been persuasively argued that economic underdevelopment is, 
paradoxically, in part a result of economic development; for the transformation to a 
modern economy, in which the developed nations and the multinational corporations 
have had a crucial role, erodes traditional means of livelihood for much of the rural 
population of the developing nations. To the extent that this is so, many (perhaps a 
majority) of those in the developing nations are absolutely harmed by relations with 
advanced countries.’ 
Id.  (quoting Judith Lichtenberg, National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan 
View, in BOUNDARIES, NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 79, 91 (1981).). 
 156. See generally ISBISTER, supra note 84, at 201 (finding that illegal immigration is an 
inevitable product of regulating immigration: “As long as the United States places any restrictions at 
all on immigration, it will automatically have undocumented immigrants.” ).  See also Simpson, 
supra note 126, at 154-55 (1984) (endorsing IRCA as a co-sponsor of the legislation by detailing the 
connection between illegal and legal immigration).  Senator Simpson’s disdain for illegal 
immigration focuses on how it hinders legal immigration: “illegal immigration endangers a fair and 
generous policy of legal immigration . . . .”  Id.  See also POWELL, supra note 87, at 154 (citing the 
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The notion of forgiving previous wrongs is a central element in many 
comprehensive reform initiatives.157  Rather than castigate 
undocumented immigrants with costly deportation programs, 
comprehensive reform focuses on viable solutions.158 
IV. AMNESTY AS A POLITICIZED TERM 
The strongest criticism that Section 245(i) has received is the label 
of amnesty.159  Appreciating the argument against readopting this 
measure requires a full understanding of the political stigma that attaches 
to an amnesty provision.160 
At the onset, Section 245(i) received little attention because it was 
not yet deemed an amnesty provision.161  Because the meaning of the 
relationship between legal and illegal immigration as a central tenet of a comprehensive approach: 
“As international migration becomes more common and terrorism a greater threat, the study of 
illegal immigration will become increasingly important to a comprehensive understanding of the 
nature and process of immigration.”). 
 157. See Vaughns, supra note 154, at 182 (arguing for comprehensive immigration reform: “A 
regularization or legalization component, however, is critical to a major overhaul of the immigration 
system.”). 
 158. Goyle & Jaeger, supra note 128, at 9 (revealing the impracticability of mass deportation: 
“The cost assessment in this report hopefully illustrates the false allure of adopting a mass 
deportation policy as a response to the challenges threatening our immigration system.”). 
 159. See JON E. DOUGHERTY, ILLEGALS: THE IMMINENT THREAT POSED BY OUR UNSECURED 
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 228-29 (WND Books 2004) (labeling Section 245(i) as amnesty and 
expressing strong disdain for the general concept of legalization).  Hearings in the House over 
comprehensive immigration reform acknowledged that using the term amnesty distracts from the 
issue: “what we have is a country that is up in arms about the fact that there is an amnesty bill out 
there and no real decent, considered, thoughtful conversation and discussion about what we do to 
deal with the problem of immigration in this country.”  Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, 
supra note 64, at 18 (statement of Rep. Waters, Member, H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Border Security and Claims). 
 160. It Isn’t Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2006, at A22 (commenting on S. 2611 and 
relating the political consequences of attaching the word amnesty to a proposed piece of legislation: 
“Attackers of a smart, tough Senate bill have smeared it with the most mealy-mouthed word in the 
immigration glossary – amnesty – in hopes of rendering it politically toxic.”). 
 161. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 4603, Departments of 
Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Aug. 26, 
1994) (referencing the effect the Act would have on illegal immigration without commenting on 
Section 245(i)).  The portion of the President’s statement relating to immigration, in its entirety, is 
as follows: 
The Act will enable the Justice Department to escalate its efforts to secure the border and 
to control illegal immigration.  Resources are provided to expand the number of agents at 
high-risk crossing points to deter illegal immigration, improve the equipment available 
to agents to increase their effectiveness, expedite deportations of criminal illegal aliens, 
and increase asylum adjudications.  The Act also provides, for the first time, a funding 
source to help States that are burdened by large numbers of criminal illegal aliens in their 
prisons.  This $130 million initiative highlights the Federal Government’s commitment 
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term “amnesty” varies depending on one’s political stance, the question 
of whether Section 245(i) is an amnesty provision becomes a threshold 
legal question for anyone hoping to readopt the measure.162 
Amnesty is perhaps the most controversial term in the immigration 
lexicon.163  For many the term signifies a complete forgiveness of illegal 
immigration.164  The concept compels harsh criticism from those who 
feel that it would unfairly reward illegal entry.165  Implicit in this 
argument is the concern for how condoning illegal immigration may 
taint the legitimacy and efficacy of legal immigration.166 
On the other hand, for undocumented immigrants and their families 
immigration reform that includes amnesty provides a glimmer of hope 
that their lives may eventually stabilize.167  Undocumented populations 
in the United States are for the most part resigned to live in the shadows 
of society.168  Given that no provision of law currently allows 
to share the responsibility for reducing the fiscal impact of illegal immigration with 
affected States. 
Id. 
 162. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 6 (statement by F. James Sensenbrenner, 
Chairman, H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims).  Chairman 
Sensenbrenner opened the proceedings by cautioning the Representatives: “This is a very emotional 
subject, there are going to be some statements that are made that people enthusiastically agree with 
or violently disagree with.”  Id. 
 163. See Mark Krikorian, Amnesty, in English; The Debate Over Amnesty Ought to be Waged 
in Plain English, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C., 
2001), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-krikorian090401.html 
(acknowledging the political ramifications of using the word amnesty and criticizing lawmakers for 
using euphemisms rather than utter the term). 
 164. John L. Martin, The Five Years War: Public Safety v. Special Interests, (Fed’n for 
American Immigr. Reform, Washington, D.C, 2005), at 2-3, available at 
http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/911report.pdf?docID=1141 (last visited Feb. 2, 2007) 
(rejecting the “earned legalization” and “out of the shadows” justifications for amnesty); The 
Amnesty Trap, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2006, at A22 (explaining why some Senators were unwilling to 
support an amnesty provision: “[a]nything other than punishment and border enforcement smacks 
unforgivably of forgiveness.”). 
 165. Mayerle, supra note 45, at 576 (chronicling the criticisms of proposed guest worker 
programs: “[a] principal argument against both of the amnesty options is that they reward 
individuals that have committed a crime by entering the country illegally.”). 
 166. See generally, supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 167. Guzman, supra note 12, at 135 (humanizing the immigration debate with examples of 
how legalization affects immigrants personally and affirming: “With a legalization program similar 
to the 1986 IRCA program, many immigrants who now seem without hope, will have a chance to 
gain permanent residency.”). 
 168. Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 102 and accompanying text.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court defined the undocumented immigration population in these terms and 
expressed a compassionate plea for justice on their behalf in Plyler v. Doe: 
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled 
with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, 
31
Siegel: Amnesty in Immigration Policy
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
SIEGEL_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:25 PM 
322 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:291 
 
undocumented immigrants to legalize their status, any discussion of 
amnesty is eagerly embraced by these populations and those who rely on 
their presence.169 
Amnesty, as it is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, addresses 
“political offenses with respect to which forgiveness is deemed more 
expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment.170  
For those who strongly oppose amnesty, accepting it as a necessary evil 
to a vexing problem is not an easy choice to make,171 especially when 
previous amnesty attempts have failed and produced lasting 
consequences.172  Nonetheless, a blanket refusal to consider any 
provision of law that resembles amnesty blindly forecloses realistic 
solutions.173 
While a true amnesty, like the one enacted in 1986, has the 
has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants--
numbering in the millions--within our borders.  This situation raises the specter of a 
permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as 
a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents.  The existence of such an underclass presents 
most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of 
equality under law. 
457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982). 
 169. See, e.g., Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Proceedings and 
Debates of the 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002) 148 CONG. REC. S2,916-01, S2,929 [hereinafter 
Enhanced Border Security Act] (statement by Sen. Tom Daschle, South Dakota) (“I remain strongly 
committed to a meaningful 245(i) extension-one that gives long-time, tax-paying residents a 
genuine opportunity to remain in this country-with their families-while they wait to become 
permanent legal residents.”);  see also Interfaith Statement in Support of Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform, October 14, 2005 available at 
http://www.justiceforimmigrants.org/files/Interfaith%20Statement.pdf (endorsing an amnesty 
provision on behalf of a wide range of organizations and community leaders). 
We call on our elected officials to enact legislation that includes…[a]n opportunity for 
hard-working immigrants who are already contributing to this country to come out of the 
shadows, regularize their status upon satisfaction of reasonable criteria and, over time, 
pursue an option to become lawful permanent residents and eventually United States 
citizens. 
Id. 
 170. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004). 
 171. Frei, supra note 41, at 1388 (“The main concern voiced by conservatives has been over 
what Republicans perceive as an amnesty component to the President’s plan, effectively rewarding 
illegal aliens for their unlawful presence in the United States.”). 
 172. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (demonstrating how criticism of IRCA 
shapes the current amnesty debate). 
 173. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 22 (prepared statement by Alan K. Simpson, 
former U.S. Sen., Wyoming) (acknowledging the perils of enacting an amnesty provision, but 
finding it to be a necessary consideration: “History shows us . . . that relying on attrition alone will 
not be successful for the majority of this cohort.  Some form of amnesty must therefore at least be 
considered, for practical reasons if for no other.”). 
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potential to cause more problems than it solves,174 a more subtle attempt 
to soften immigration laws should be considered as an experimental 
middle-ground alternative.175  The all-or-nothing approach176 to 
immigration, which has driven politics for the last quarter century,177 has 
proven itself to be unworkable.178  Effective immigration reform 
requires some compromise between punishing undocumented 
immigrants and uncovering the 179
V. REJECTING AMNESTY: PRESIDENT BUSH’S STANCE 
President Bush’s explicit condemnation of amnesty reflects the 
severe political consequences of proposing any concept that may be 
labeled as such.180  In his radio address on April 8, 2006 the President 
 174. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing IRCA). 
 175. President George W. Bush, Pres. Messages, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
D60, at 3 (“There is a rational middle ground between granting an automatic path to citizenship for 
every illegal immigrant, and a program of mass deportation.”). 
 176. Meissner, supra note 84.  The 1990’s was an era of political extremism in nearly all facets 
of government, including immigration policy.  Id.  Immigration laws enacted in the 1990’s reflect 
this perspective: “We have all experienced a period of tremendous polarization on too many issues 
including immigration.”  Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Reimers, supra note 11 (explaining the trend of restrictive immigration positions 
among voters in the United States between 1970-1998: “As revealed in public opinion polls, when 
immigration increased and changed Americans reasserted their traditional ambivalence or hostility 
toward immigrants”). 
 178. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 90 (statement by Chairman F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Wisconsin) (“I’m afraid that a lot of what has gone on this year in terms of the 
public discourse on immigration on both sides of the question has further polarized the public.  And 
instead of going toward the middle, we have gone further apart.  And that’s going to make our job 
as elected representatives of the people a lot more difficult in terms of reaching something that can 
get a majority vote in both the House and the Senate and the President’s signature . . . .”). 
 179. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 
http://www.aila.org/issues/issue.aspx?docid=18635 (last visited January 21, 2007) (giving the 
American Immigration Lawyer’s Association recommendations for immigration reform). 
AILA believes that any workable immigration reform proposal must be comprehensive. 
Specifically, it must simultaneously create legal avenues for people to enter the U.S.; 
allow people already here an opportunity to earn legal status; address backlogs in family 
and employment-based immigration; and create and implement a smart border security 
and enforcement regime. 
Id. 
 180. See Carl Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, Senate Passes Two Immigration Measures, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 2006, at A25 (quoting Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Republican of 
Wisconsin, in his blanket refusal to consider President Bush’s approach to immigration reform: 
“[r]egardless of what the president says, what he is proposing is amnesty”); see also Germain, supra 
note 90, at 749-50 (“The President and his advisors were careful to avoid any mention of the ‘A’ 
word or ‘Amnesty.’ This word is taboo for anyo [sic] proposing any sort of immigration reform, so 
it is often referred to using other names.”). 
33
Siegel: Amnesty in Immigration Policy
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
SIEGEL_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:25 PM 
324 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:291 
 
proposed a temporary worker program.181  In his discussion he clarified 
repeatedly that his plan specifically rejected amnesty.182  Nonetheless, 
those who stand firmly against any notion of amnesty are critical of 
President Bush’s position.183 
In May of 2001 President Bush wrote to Congress in an effort to 
save Section 245(i).184  In his plea to extend the provision for those 
undocumented immigrants who were eligible, but missed the deadline, 
he advised Congress that “[i]t remains in our national interest to 
legitimize those resident immigrants, eligible for legal status, and to 
welcome them as full participants of our society.”185  The immigrants 
whom President Bush referred to were immigrants who had either 
entered illegally or overstayed their visas, and then remained in the 
United States for years without legal status.186 
Political opponents have heavily criticized President Bush for 
supporting legalization statutes such as Section 245(i), while rejecting 
amnesty.187  Such critics assert that President Bush’s hard-line 
convictions against amnesty are deceptive.188  In 2006 President Bush 
appeared to make his position on amnesty clear to the American people: 
A new temporary worker program should not provide amnesty.  
 181. President George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, The White House, Office of 
Commc’ns, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2006) [hereinafter President Bush’s Radio Address] (recommending a 
three-part plan for comprehensive immigration reform that would include increased border security, 
enhanced law enforcement, and finally a temporary worker program).  This excerpt is one of many 
speeches President Bush has given in support of a guest worker program.  See, e.g., President Bush 
Proposes New Temporary Worker Program, (Jan. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html. 
 182. Id. at 1-2 (President Bush dismissed amnesty in the first sentence of his guest worker 
proposal: “comprehensive immigration reform must include a temporary worker program that 
relieves pressure on our borders, while rejecting amnesty.”).  While President Bush had previously 
urged Congress to adopt a guest worker program that would include a legalization component, this 
proposal clearly rejected any form of legalization.  Id. 
 183. Buchanan, supra note 11, at 252 (“Though President Bush may declare, ‘I oppose 
amnesty!’ every time he speaks, his guest worker program is amnesty, both for the illegals and for 
the businesses that hired them.”). 
 184. President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Krikorian, supra note 127 (criticizing similar statements that President Bush made in 
2001: “In August, President Bush said, ‘There's going to be no amnesty,’ though he immediately 
contradicted himself by saying he favors a plan ‘that will legalize the hard work that's taking place 
now in America.’”); see also William Norman Grigg, The United States Should Not Legalize Illegal 
Immigrants, in  IMMIGRATION (Louise I. Gerdes ed., Thomson Gale 2005), at 114-21 (strongly 
criticizing President Bush for supporting a legalization approach and finding his position on 
amnesty to be deceptive). 
 188. Id. 
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Granting amnesty would be unfair to those who follow the rules and 
obey the laws.  Amnesty would also be unwise, because it would 
encourage others to break the law and create new waves of illegal 
immigration.  We must ensure that those who break our laws are not 
granted an automatic path to citizenship.189 
There are two ways to interpret President Bush’s seemingly 
contradictory statements concerning amnesty.  One would be to draw no 
distinction, and conclude that President Bush’s endorsement of Section 
245(i) is entirely consistent with his firm stance against amnesty.190  The 
other approach would be to find that his position necessarily contradicts 
itself by condemning amnesty, and then endorsing it at the same time.191  
 Amnesty opponents argue that if President Bush were against 
amnesty then he would not have encouraged Congress to legitimize 
undocumented immigrants by any means.192  Meanwhile amnesty 
proponents contend either that Section 245(i) is not amnesty, or if it is 
amnesty, it was harmless with respect to the issues raised by President 
Bush, and therefore constituted an “amnesty” far different from any 
legalization proposed today. 
VI. LEGALIZATION VERSUS AMNESTY 
The conflicting interpretations of amnesty assume different 
definitions of the term.  In one sense the term “amnesty” represents any 
provision which would allow undocumented immigrants to become legal 
residents.193  This approach frames amnesty as any law which does not 
effectively punish the undocumented immigrant population.194  Anti-
 189. President’s Radio Address, supra note 134. 
 190. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. LEMAY, U.S. IMMIGRATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 33 (ABC-
CLIO, Inc. 2004) (recapitulating Bush’s policy as entirely against legalization: “The administration 
of President George W. Bush opposes legalization, favoring instead achieving some migration 
accord with Mexico and perhaps an expanded guest-worker program.”).  While the text provides 
information on Section 245(i) and other legalization programs, there is no mention of President 
Bush’s endorsement.  Id. at 32-34, 73-75, 175. 
 191. See Krikorian, supra note 127 (accusing the Bush administration of deceptively 
supporting amnesty, but calling it by a different term: “there's been a mad rush to come up with 
alternative descriptions for what is plainly an amnesty.”). 
 192. Hulse & Rutenberg, supra note 42 (quoting Republican Senator Tom Coburn as saying 
“[w]hether they say it is amnesty or not, it is amnesty when somebody here illegally gets a path to 
citizenship without going back to their home country”). 
 193. See id. (providing insight on Republican skepticism of amnesty: “[Senator Saxby 
Chambliss, Republican of Georgia] and other Republicans said Mr. Bush’s plan would be viewed as 
amnesty by many Americans, even if illegal immigrants had to pay fines and meet other 
requirements, because they would still be rewarded with legal status.”). 
 194. For a criticism of this approach see Jacoby, supra note 97, at 113.  Jacoby provides 
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immigrant lobbyists generally define the term in this over-inclusive 
manner.195  Those who approach undocumented immigrants with 
condemnation reject amnesties on the grounds that they encourage 
unlawful activity.196 
A narrow construction of amnesty distinguishes between a law that 
serves alternative policy objectives and one that merely forgives the 
evasion of immigration laws.197  Under this approach, a law allowing 
undocumented immigrants to legalize their status is only considered 
amnesty when it rewards illegal entry by removing all sanctions.198  This 
more specific interpretation of amnesty differentiates the negative 
connotation of rewarding the offense from the practical, efficient 
enforcement of immigration laws.199 
impassioned commentary on why this political stance is ineffective: 
Conservatives who criticize the Bush proposal as an unprincipled ‘amnesty’ assume that 
there are alternatives—that we can simply crack down harder on  the border and enforce 
any quota we like, no matter how unrealistic.  But we can’t.  Mexican workers want to 
fill jobs in the United States, and they will continue to find ways to enter the country.  
Without immigration reform, it will be business as usual on our southern frontier: more 
futile law enforcement, more migrant deaths, and more crime. 
Id. 
 195. See, e.g., DIRK CHASE ELDREDGE, CROWDED LAND OF LIBERTY 82 (Bridge Works 
Publishing 2001) (strongly criticizing any notion of amnesty: “Amnesty for illegals in this country 
should be renamed ‘acquiescence.’”). 
 196. Id. at 83 (finding amnesty to encourage undocumented immigration: “amnesty actually 
invites further illegal immigration.  It sends the message to potential illegal immigrants everywhere 
that America is not really serious about keeping you out, so come on in, keep a low profile for a few 
years, and another amnesty will soon appear on the horizon.”); Rachel L. Swarns, House Negotiator 
Calls Senate Immigration Bill “Amnesty’’ and Rejects It, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A9 (quoting 
Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Republican of Wisconsin and chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, as saying “Amnesty is wrong because it rewards someone for illegal 
behavior.”). 
 197. The debate over whether 245(i) constitutes amnesty illustrates this ideological conflict.  
Compare, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 83 (“Section 245(i) does not provide amnesty to immigrants”) 
with Numbers USA, http://www.numbersusa.com/interests/amnesty_print.html (last visited Jan. 14, 
2006) (an anti-immigration website listing Section 245(i) and the two extensions of the provision as 
amnesties) and, Border Security and Immigration Issues Hearing, supra note 43, at 5 (labeling 
Section 245(i) as “rolling amnesty” and stating that it was “responsible for legalizing at least 1.5 
million illegal aliens”). 
 198. Pro-immigrant advocates argue that a legalization program does not constitute amnesty 
when it requires some form of quid pro quo in exchange for the benefit of adjusting status. See 
President George W. Bush, Pres. Messages, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. D60, at 3-4 
(distinguishing a proposed legalization program from amnesty: “I believe that illegal immigrants 
who have roots in our country and want to stay should have to pay a meaningful penalty for 
breaking the law, to pay their taxes, to learn English, and to work in a job for a number of years.  
People who meet these conditions should be able to apply for citizenship, but approval would not be 
automatic and they will have to wait in line behind those who played by the rules and followed the 
law.  What I’ve just described is not amnesty . . . .”). 
 199. Id. 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/5
SIEGEL_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:25 PM 
2008] AMNESTY IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 327 
 
The hard-line approach, which refuses any form of relief to 
undocumented immigrants, was recently articulated by James R. 
Edwards, Jr. in his presentation to the House of Representatives at a 
2006 hearing on immigration reform.200  According to Edwards, any 
relief afforded to these immigrants in obtaining legal status would 
amount to amnesty:201 “As a rule, amnesties should be employed 
sparingly and carefully.  They indeed do affront the rule of law because 
amnesty is an act whereby the civil government overlooks lawbreaking.  
Amnesty in effect rewards lawbreakers for their lawbreaking.  Amnesty 
lets off certain lawbreakers.”202  Edwards’ approach to amnesty 
represents one side of a heated debate, that of strict opposition against 
any provision of law that would allow undocumented immigrants to 
legalize status.203  This approach rejects a central component of 
comprehensive immigration reform, and opts instead for enforcement-
only.204 
On the other side of the debate are those who support a legalization 
process.205  While there is a strong tendency to define amnesty as 
 200. Border Security and Immigration Issues Hearing, supra note 43.  Edwards testified on 
Senate Bill S. 2611.  Id.  He compared the bill to the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(“IRCA”) and found both pieces of legislation to be amnesties.  Id. 
 201. Id. (“the legalization provisions in S. 2611 and similar arrangements in other legislation 
can only be described as amnesty”). 
 202. Id. at 3 (Edwards’ strong disdain for amnesty is evident in his connections between illegal 
and legal immigration: “amnesty of illegal aliens rewards their dishonorable, disorderly, lawless 
conduct in a highly public manner that effectively insults legal immigrants.”).  The notion that 
amnesty rewards lawbreakers is the dominant argument used by critics to oppose such legislation.  
See Mayerle, supra note 45; see also Frei, supra note 41. 
 203. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 11, at 252  (projecting a strong anti-amnesty stance that 
pronounces President Bush’s guest worker plans as deceptive amnesties). 
 204. For criticism on the enforcement-only approach see National Immigration Law Center, 
Enforcement-only approach to immigration reform will give boost to the most unscrupulous 
employers, EJC & NILC testify, 20 IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UPDATE (2006), available at 
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/cir018.htm.  The article summarizes the Congressional 
testimony of Bill Beardall: “If anything, the U.S.'s experience with the provisions of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 have taught us that an enforcement-only approach 
actually creates incentives for employers to hire unauthorized workers . . . .”  Id.  Beardall’s actual 
testimony states: “The enforcement-without-reform policy of the last 20 years, including the 
initiation of employer sanctions, has been a resounding and obvious failure.” Field Hearing on 
Immigration: Enforcing Employee Work Eligibility Laws and Implementing a Stronger Employment 
Verification System, Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on 
Education and the Workforce, 109th Cong 2 (2006) (statement of Bill Beardall, Executive Director, 
Equal Justice Center); see also Gallegos, supra note 29, at 1772-73 (providing examples to illustrate 
the ineffectiveness of an enforcement-only approach: “Because current laws are inadequate, 
heightened enforcement may compound already existing harms.”). 
 205. See, e.g., It Isn’t Amnesty, supra note 160, at A22 (supporting S. 2611’s proposed 
legalization provision: “Senate Judiciary Committee under its chairman, Arlen Specter, has 
37
Siegel: Amnesty in Immigration Policy
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
SIEGEL_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:25 PM 
328 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:291 
 
Edwards has, advocates of a legalization process often do not consider 
their proposals to constitute amnesty.206  For these supporters illegal 
entries or stays in the United States are not necessarily crimes that need 
to be punished by a denial of immigration benefits.207 
While the illegal entry and stay are clear violations of the INA,208 
the question of whether to punish such violations need not presume 
approved [a] smart, tough immigration that does not, as its detractors charge, confer amnesty on 
[an] estimated 12 million people living in [the] country illegally; [the] bill addresses enforcement, 
but also, unlike [the] House counterpart, takes on [the] hard job of trying to sort out immigrants who 
want to stay and follow rules from those who do not.”). 
 206. Id.  (defending S. 2611 against the title of amnesty: “[t]he path to citizenship laid out by 
the Specter bill wouldn’t be easy.  It would take 11 years, a clean record, a steady job, payment of a 
$2,000 fine and back taxes, and knowledge of English and civics.  That’s not ‘amnesty,’ with its 
suggestion of getting something for nothing”); but see Martin, supra note 164, at 6 (characterizing 
S. 2611 as amnesty regardless of what criteria the bill requires undocumented immigrants to fulfill 
as preconditions to legalization).  Perhaps the most well-known spokesman for this position is 
President George W. Bush.  Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform, (Jan. 7, 2004), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040107-1.html).  At various 
stages in his presidency, Bush encouraged Congress to enact legislation that would allow 
undocumented immigrants to legalize their status.  See, e.g, id.  While promoting measures which 
critics would deplore as amnesty, the President’s statements and press releases affirmatively 
rejected any notion of amnesty.  Id.  In 2004, President Bush proposed a temporary guest worker 
program for the population of undocumented immigrants then-present in the United States.  Id.  The 
press release for this guest worker initiative described a legalization program that would apply to 
“undocumented men and women,” while disclaiming “President Bush does not support amnesty . . . 
.”  Id.  In 2006, President Bush proposed a similar temporary worker program as part of his 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform plan.  Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Immigration Reform: 
Securing Our Border, Enforcing Our Laws, and Upholding Our Values (Mar. 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060327-1.html.  Although this suggestion 
differed from the earlier proposal enough to appear less like amnesty, the President’s release 
asserted that it was not amnesty five times.  Id. 
 207. Amnesty provisions would change the law itself, rather than create an exception to the 
law.  See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 (11th Cir. 1984) (advancing the wide latitude that 
Congress has to design immigration laws) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (The Chinese Exclusion 
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 
2.2a (rev. 1982); cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (noting that powers of 
the federal government with regard to aliens are more limited outside the immediate context of 
regulating entry: “there are apparently no limitations on the power of the federal government to 
determine what classes of aliens will be permitted to enter the United States or what procedures will 
be used to determine their admissibility.”). 
 208. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (West 2005) (I.N.A. § 237) (stating the consequence of 
unlawful presence: “Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any 
other law of the United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing 
admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked under section 1201(i) of this 
title is deportable”); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 2005) (I.N.A. § 212) (defining an illegal 
entrant: “An alien present in the United States without being paroled, or who arrives in the United 
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible”); 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (West 2005) (I.N.A. § 237) (stating the consequence of unlawful entry: 
“Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of 
aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”). 
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amnesty.209  Contrary to the criticism that amnesties “reward 
lawbreakers”210 and “allow illegal immigrants to cut in line,” most 
legalization proposals impose significant penalties for having initially 
broken the law, and require beneficiaries to earn the privilege to adjust 
status on a schedule behind that of non-lawbreaking applicants.211 
VII. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Absent from the recent debates on immigration reform has been any 
discussion of reenacting Section 245(i) of the INA.212  Reincorporating 
this simple piece of legislation213 presents a workable resolution to the 
 209. Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64.  Representative Jackson Lee 
took issue with the premise of the hearing, as she refuted the label of amnesty for S. 2611: “the 
question of this hearing uses the word ‘amnesty,’ which has been infused with negative 
connotations by the opponents of the Senate’s bill, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 
2006, S. 2611.  The Senate bill in fact would not grant amnesty.”  Id. at 4. 
 210. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials: Must Aliens Bet Their 
Lives to Get Into Court?, 25 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 53, 54 (1990) (characterizing IRCA’s 
amnesty as a reward: “The amnesty provision is generous and liberal, essentially rewarding those 
who have violated United States law for at least six years.”). 
 211. See, e.g., Hearing on How Illegal Immigration Impacts Constituencies, Part II, supra note 
147, at 39 (statement of Rep. Gutierrez, Witness, Illinois).  In his presentation urging Congress to 
enact a legalization provision, Mr. Gutierrez identified the full extent of sanctions that 
undocumented immigrants are willing to endure before earning legal status: 
Let’s fine them a thousand five hundred bucks . . . .  Let’s put them in to a program for 7 
years and say you don’t get anything for 7 years unless you work, you pay taxes, you 
follow all the laws.  Let’s put them into indentured servitude programs, but let’s give 
them hope at the end of the day that after they’ve proven to us, they already are hard-
working, committed people to America, that we say at the end of the day, okay, you’ve 
earned it.  You get to join the rest of us, as our history has always allowed us to do in our 
immigration policy.  So I join the Congresswoman in seeking that earned legalization. 
Id. 
 212. Compare President George W. Bush, Remarks to the City Club of Cleveland and a 
Question-and-Answer Session in Cleveland, Ohio, 42 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS 12 (March 27, 2006) (averting the issue entirely when asked directly about his position 
on extending Section 245(i)) and President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72.and 
accompanying text (demonstrating President Bush’s enthusiastic support for reenacting Section 
245(i) in 2002).  In 2006 two bills were introduced that would have extended Section 245(i), but 
neither prompted a debate in Congress.  See Rep. Rangel Introduces Effort to Ease Path to 
Permanent Residency, US FED NEWS, June 30, 2006, (Rep. Charles B. Rangel, New York, 
introduced H.R. 5741 on June 29, 2006, which would have reenacted Section 245(i)) and Rep. 
Cleaver Introduces Bill to Amend U.S. Immigration Emanuel Cleaver, US FED NEWS, July 12, 
2006, (Rep. Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri, introduced H.R. 5747 on July 10, 2006 to extend Section 
245(i)). 
 213. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing the full text of the law as stated in 
the INA); compare Stephen Yale-Loehr & Daniel M. Kowalski, Cut Through the Noise: Key Trends 
in Immigration Law, Miller Mayer, attorneys at law, available at 
http://www.millermayer.com/new/key_trends.html (last visited January 22, 2007). 
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current impasse.214  Because it is a relatively straightforward and time-
tested alternative to enacting a complicated new law,215 Section 245(i) 
could potentially alleviate some of the United States’ post 9/11 security 
concerns, by allowing certain undocumented immigrants to become 
official, registered residents.216 
Reenacting Section 245(i) presents a viable solution to the current 
amnesty debate because the Act serves competing objectives.217  First, 
the provision has proven to be an effective means for undocumented 
immigrants to legalize status.218  Legalization is only effective when the 
potential beneficiaries trust the system enough to come forward out of 
the shadows.219  While in effect between 1994 and 2001, Section 245(i) 
 214. See generally Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4 (explaining the origin, 
significance and practical usage of INA Section 245 in the practice of law); see also Lofgren, supra 
note 61 and accompanying text (stating her personal recollection that the House of Representatives 
did not discuss Section 245(i) when it was reenacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act). 
 215. Yale-Loehr & Kowalski, supra note 213.  Immigration practitioners have characterized S. 
2611 as an exacerbation of the existing problems because it adds complexity: 
This complexity will only increase if Congress enacts immigration reform. The bill the 
U.S. Senate passed in December 2005 is 796 pages long. As just one example, the Senate 
bill would not grant blanket ‘amnesty’ for undocumented workers. Instead, the bill 
divides the undocumented into three groups, depending on how long they have been in 
the United States. Each group has its own eligibility requirements and restrictions. 
Id. 
 216. See Kennedy, supra note 83 (“Extending 245(i) does not provide any loopholes for 
potential terrorists. Instead, it will improve the monitoring of immigrants already residing in this 
country. Individuals who qualify for permanent residency and process their applications in the U.S. 
are subject to rigorous background checks and interviews. This process provides the government a 
good opportunity to investigate individuals who are in this country and determine whether they 
should be allowed to remain here.”); but see Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995, 
Proceedings and Debates of the 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996), 142 CONG. REC. H2,589-01, 
H2,603 [hereinafter Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995] (statement by Rep. Dana 
Rohrabacher, California) (“This loophole also has serious repercussions for the security of our 
Nation.  Under the Kennedy loophole, certain people who sneak across our border or illegally 
overstay their visas can apply for permanent resident status at the local INS office.”). 
 217. See Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Act of 2002: Proceedings 
and Debates of the 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002), 148 Cong. Rec. H1,632-03, H1,643 (statement 
by Rep. Udall, Colorado) (offering support for reenacting Section 245(i): “this provision does not 
grant an amnesty, give immigrants the right to work, or protect them from deportation if they are 
living in the U.S. illegally.  What it does do is keep families together and encourage those who 
qualify for permanent residency to continue filling an economic need and to become part of a 
regulated system.”). 
 218. Section 245(i) effectively incorporated many undocumented immigrants into the legal 
process by promising not to arrest immigrants who filed applications.  GREEN, supra note 58, at 64 
(“The government promised it would not arrest illegal immigrants for deportation on the basis of 
their 245(i) applications.”). 
 219. See Juffras, supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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proved capable of meeting this challenge.220  Hundreds of thousands of 
undocumented immigrants flocked to immigration attorneys during the 
brief period when Section 245(i) was in effect.221  When the Act expired 
there were still many more immigrants who would have qualified for 
adjustment, but failed to meet the deadline.222  Immigration 
practitioners’ familiarity with the law, and settled case law that provides 
guidance on how the section works within the entire body of 
immigration laws, indicate that Section 245(i) has established credible 
reliance interests which will carry forward to a new reenactment.223 
Second, Section 245(i) effectively punished immigrants who had 
skirted the law initially, and hence was not a “free pass” or an incentive 
to break the law.224  Immigrants, who relied on this alternative to 
consular processing, paid a premium fee for the privilege, which was 
five times in excess of the standard fee.  In addition, the law did not 
benefit all undocumented immigrants.225  Rather, it selectively served 
only the most deserving members of our society, those whose claim to 
legal status was already supported by another existing code section.226  
 220. Carlos Alcala, Many Try to Beat Residency Deadline: Extension is Likely but Lines Long 
at INS, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 1, 1997, at B3 (chronicling the masses of immigrants who were 
eager to take advantage of Section 245(i) before it expired: “Would-be immigrants lined up by the 
hundreds at Sacramento immigration offices Tuesday - and the same scene played out around the 
country.”). 
 221. See GREEN, supra note 58, at 64 (“The INS estimated that about 540,000 immigrants 
would be eligible under the act.”). 
 222. See President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72. 
 223. See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE Act), and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 10 
A.L.R. FED. 2D 435 (2006) (providing explanatory information on the application of Section 245(i) 
and citing relevant case law to guide practitioners). 
 224. Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, § 1(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West 2006) ; see 
Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1240 (2005) (“The Legal Immigration Family Equity 
(LIFE) Act allows certain persons who entered without inspection or otherwise violated their status, 
and thus are ineligible to apply for adjustment of status in the United States, to seek adjustment 
nonetheless if they pay a $1,000 penalty.”); see also JAMES G. GIMPEL AND JAMES R. EDWARDS, 
JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 313 (1999) (referencing the penalty, 
which at the time was $1,000 and stating that “245(i) had raised millions of dollars for the INS”). 
 225. Flores v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 2003) (establishing that adjustment of 
status under Section 245(i) does not apply to an immigrant who has prior orders of removal); INS 
on Amendment and Extension of Section 245(i), INS Memoranda , 2 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION 
BULLETIN 1067 (1997) (“Under the amended section 245(i), aliens who do not meet the adjustment 
requirements of section 245(a) are eligible to apply for adjustment of status only if they are 
beneficiaries of a visa petition filed with the Attorney General under section 204 or a labor 
certification which was filed pursuant to Department of Labor regulations.”). 
 226. Id; see also Kennedy, supra note 83 (providing the following statistic in support of 
reenacting comprehensive immigration reform: “[s]eventy-five percent of the people who have used 
245(i) are the spouses and children of U.S. citizens and permanent residents.”); Immigration in the 
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Section 245(i) meets the demands of skeptics who argue that “amnesties 
should be employed sparingly and carefully.”227  As compared to IRCA, 
which legalized approximately three million undocumented immigrants 
in six years,228 Section 245(i) had a much more modest impact.229 
Third, Section 245(i) does not send a message to foreigners that 
undocumented immigration is an effective alternative to applying for 
entry.230  A principal criticism of legalization is that it will inspire new 
immigrants to enter illegally.231  In the final reenactment of Section 
245(i) Congress specifically addressed this concern by adding a physical 
presence requirement.232  Following this additional requirement, any 
immigrant who entered after the law went into effect could not access 
the benefit.233 
National Interest Act of 1995, supra note 201, at H2,604 (statement by Rep. Xavier Becerra, 
California) (lending his support for the provision: “Section 245(i) . . . does not permit anyone to 
gain lawful permanent residence who would otherwise be disqualified.”). 
 227. Border Security and Immigration Issues Hearing, supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 228. MEI LING REIN, IMMIGRATION AND ILLEGAL ALIENS: BURDEN OR BLESSING? 16 (The 
Gale Group eds., Thompson Learning 2002). 
 229. See GREEN, supra note 58 and accompanying text (citing the number of immigrants which 
the INS anticipated would be affected by the provision); see also Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics, Department of Homeland Security, Legal Permanent Residents, Data Tables, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/table01.xls; Legal Permanent Resident 
Flow: Fiscal Years 1820 to 2005, Table 1, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR05.shtm (showing a significant increase in 
the number of adjustments between 1989-1991 when the bulk of IRCA applications were processed,  
but no comparable increase after 1994 when Section 245(i) first passed).  The report does show that 
numbers rose to the IRCA levels following the cut-off date of Section 245(i) in 2001.  Id.  This 
lends support to the argument that Section 245(i) should be reenacted permanently in order to avoid 
this unmanageable swell in applicants.  See also Nelly Jefferys & Nancy Rytina, supra note 4 
(providing data on the total number of immigrants who have adjusted status).  Unfortunately, the 
report does not identify how many immigrants adjusted status using Section 245(i).  Id.  The report 
does state: “In 2005, a total of 1,122,373 persons became LPRs [lawful permanent residents] of the 
United States . . . .  The majority (66 percent) lived in the United States when they became LPRs.”  
Id. at 1. 
 230. See Alcala, supra note 220 and accompanying text (because Section 245(i) does not apply 
to immigrants with prior orders of removal, it will not incite a wave of new undocumented 
immigrants). 
 231. Don Feder, Illegal Immigrants Should Not Be Given Amnesty, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION; 
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Wiliam Dudley ed., 2002), at 125 (“Extending blanket amnesty tells 
inhabitants of the impoverished Third World that if they can sneak past the Border Patrol, Uncle 
Softie will eventually welcome them with open arms.”). 
 232. 146 CONG. REC. S11,850-02, S11,851 (2000) (explaining the nature and purpose of 
Congress’ revisions to Section 245(i): “They also add a new requirement that for all beneficiaries 
whose application was filed after January 14, 1998, the principal beneficiary must have been 
physically present in the U.S. on the date of enactment of the LIFE Act Amendments of 2000. The 
function of this last requirement is to make sure that the renewed availability of section 245(i) does 
not operate to encourage anyone to violate our immigration laws.”). 
 233. Id. 
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In addition to reenacting Section 245(i), Congress should also 
consider removing the three and ten-year bars.234  After careful 
consideration of whether the bars serve their intended purpose, and 
whether reenacting Section 245(i) would alone be an adequate safeguard 
to prevent the deterrence to exit, a decision to remove the bars could 
reduce the number of undocumented immigrants currently in the United 
States.235  Now that exceptional amounts of resources have been 
dedicated to improving border security, it makes sense to remove the 
disincentive for undocumented immigrants to cross back into their home 
countries. 
The arguments in support of legalization either deny that the 
definition of amnesty should apply, or reject the notion that amnesty is 
undesirable.236  The two lines of argument are merely a difference in 
semantics, but they illustrate the strong political clout the word 
evokes.237  Those who support amnesty and those who refute the idea 
that a legalization process constitutes amnesty both agree that a well-
drafted legalization statute can effectively address the undocumented 
immigration population, and serve the objectives of comprehensive 
immigration reform.238 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Amnesty proponents readily concede that undocumented 
immigration is not a problem to be solved.239 So long as there is no 
 234. See Foster, supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 235. Id. 
 236. American Friends Service Committee, 'Legalization' or 'Amnesty'? Understanding the 
Debate, http://www.afsc.org/immigrants-rights/policy/legalization-amnesty.htm (last visited Feb. 
17, 2007) (explaining how the term amnesty is used among legalization advocates: “Within the 
immigrants’ rights community, others argue that, although they also support granting LPR [lawful 
permanent resident] status to undocumented immigrants, legislators in Congress are unwilling to 
even begin a conversation if the term ‘amnesty’ is used. Therefore, they prefer the term 
‘legalization.’”). 
 237. See Hearing on How Illegal Immigration Impacts Constituencies, Part II, supra note 147, 
at 24 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, California) (identifying the linguistic distortion of the 
term: “You can call anything an amnesty and defeat everything by doing it.”). 
 238. Id. at 5.  Representative Jackson Lee explained that S. 2611 is not amnesty because it does 
not “forget or overlook immigration law violations.”  Id. at 4.  She detailed how the Senate bill is 
not an escape of responsibility: “[t]he Senate bill clearly asks those to get in line, to be able to be 
documented, whether or not they can meet the standards of status or citizenship, keep their records 
clean, employed for six years, to establish eligibility for permanent resident status and pay a 
substantial fine.”  Id. at 5. 
 239. MILTON D. MORRIS & ALBERT MAYIO, CURBING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 36 (The 
Brookings Institution 1982) (“In view of the long history and powerful forces behind illegal 
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realistic opportunity to enter legally at the onset, nor regularize once 
here illegally, undocumented immigrants will continue to risk 
deportation by averting the law.240  Congress should nonetheless feel a 
pressing duty to address the issue by crafting a functional immigration 
code.241  Immigration practitioners and the undocumented population 
that seek their assistance need an outlet to engage the legal process.242  
In order to prove successful, immigration reform should focus on those 
needs, rather than on constituents who have politicized the amnesty 
debate.243 
In the current era of immigration policy, legalization efforts are 
justifiably plagued by the legacy of IRCA.244  Amnesty, as it is 
understood in the immigration context, suffers from this unavoidable 
correlation with a failed attempt to fix a vastly complex social dilemma 
in one broad stroke.245 
The negative connotation which the term amnesty carries reflects 
both myth and reality.246  The reality is that full-scale amnesty, as 
implemented in 1986, failed to rectify a broken immigration system.247  
The myth is that because of this failure all legalization attempts should 
be subjected to heightened scrutiny and skepticism.248  Rather, 
predicting the success or failure of immigration reform measures 
demands a tempered analysis.249  Whether the concept is referred to as 
immigration, no single act or set of actions by the United States will eliminate it.  Illegal 
immigration will always be part of American life.”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing lawmakers’ duty to address the 
undocumented immigrant population). 
 242. It is Time to Reform Our Immigration Laws, Posted on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 
02101071 (Oct. 10, 2002), Inman and Associates, http://www.igvlaw.com/sys-
tmpl/newimmigrationlaw/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (demonstrating immigration lawyers’ support 
for legalization in general, and specifically for an extension of 245(i)). 
 243. Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of 
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1207 (describing 
how immigration services focus on enforcement in order to appease constituents). 
 244. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text (connecting IRCA with the current amnesty 
debate).  See also Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Working Paper, Do Amnesty Programs 
Encourage Illegal Immigration? Evidence from the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 
12 Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta (2001), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/frbatlanta/filelegacydocs/wp0119.pdf (using the effects of IRCA as data 
to conclude that amnesty programs do not incite additional waves of immigration). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See generally supra notes 159-179 and accompanying text. 
 247. See note 42 and accompanying text. 
 248. See note 173 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Lofgren, supra note 49, at 378-79 (concluding that radical changes to immigration 
law will not produce the desired results of immigration reform). 
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amnesty or legalization should be of no consequence to the utility of its 
design.250  Incorporating a provision in the INA that would enable 
immigrants already within the United States to adjust their legal status 
must be approached with reasoned analysis instead of fear or dis 251
The political dogma that drives criticism of amnesty must give way 
to even-handed reform initiatives before Section 245(i) will have an 
opportunity to resurface.252  Despite proven success in attaining 
immigration goals,253 Section 245(i) is at the mercy of public opinion.254  
Once immigration policy debates shift from polarized factions to a 
solution-oriented approach, Section 245(i) may eventually escape the 
amnesty misnomer that currently prevents reenactment.255 
Without Section 245(i) in place to soften the effect of the bars, the 
three and ten-year sanctions to reentry are simply too harsh to serve their 
intended purpose.256  So long as the bars act to trap undocumented 
immigrants in the country, rather than deter illegal entry in the first 
place, they are counter effective and therefore should be repealed.257 
Bryn Siegel 
 250. See notes 236-238 and accompanying text. 
 251. Enhanced Border Security Act, supra note 169 (statement by Sen. Tom Daschle, South 
Carolina) (addressing criticism while urging Congress to extend Section 245(i): “Within hours after 
the twin towers collapsed, we heard some people say that America should close its doors to 
immigrants.  Some people even said we should force out immigrants who are already here, working 
and contributing to our society.  People who say such things need to understand that our enemy is 
not immigrants, it is intolerance and hatred.”). 
 252. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 24 (prepared statement of Alan K. Simpson, 
Former U.S. Sen., Wyoming) (“IRCA’s lesson on guestworkers . . . is to make certain that the terms 
of the program are dictated by sound practical policy, and not by coalition politics.”). 
 253. See Lofgren, supra note 49, at 363. 
 254. See note 162 and accompanying text. 
 255. See HING, supra note 101, at 43 (drawing the distinction between objective and subjective 
rationales: “Any policy related to ‘solving’ the undocumented migration issue will be debated with 
value-laden rhetoric and overtones of what is the morally right thing to do.  Policymakers may act 
on personal impulse and intuition or may look for objective guidance to help make a decision.”). 
 256. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 257. Id. 
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